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A. Proble~ and definition: European intecration, Eurcpe~~ fiscal 
ad.~ust~ent and the financinr- of the EuroneD..n Co:-"""1lni ties• 
The problem of providing adequate finance for the tasks allotted to the 
European institutions arises regardless of what ideas are held about the 
ccncept and objectives of European integration. If the degree of 
integration achieved is to meet the conditions of a federal state, the 
tas~s undertaken on a sovereign basis at the "Europea.."'l level" need adequate 
finance just as much as the tasks allocated at the supranaticnal level if 
integ~ation does not progress beyond the status quo. At all stages in the 
process of economic and political integration, therefore, there is a need 
for a rational revenue system, in which financing will be a dependent 
variable influenced by the degree of integration achieved at the ti~e. 
The ccnverse can also be considered. The revenue syste~ at European level 
has repe~cussions which may hamper or promote integration. Cn the one 
ha.."'ld inadequate or non-existent financial autonomy at European level would 
do little to hasten the integration process. On the other hand the 
granting of greater autonomy with regard to revenue and the adoption of 
fo~s of financing likely to promote integration would produce an i~petus 
towards integration. A European fiscal adjustment system may be regarded 
as a precondition for a European union going beyond the status quo and as 
an important support for the desired economic and monetary union. The 
r.r.;.tual de;:endence between the financing of "Europe" and the atte!::pts to 
unite Europe is the subject of this article, a the~e which is often 
neglected in discussions of the prerequisites for a European eccno=ic 
and conetary union. 
• T::e E-:1 ::-_c!' wo'J.ld like to th~"'lk l·:r Klaus Sch."'leide~ of t!".e 
Coc..::-.issicn of the :European Corrr.!uni ties and l·:r & ... :i!l Reister 
of t~e Gene~al Secretariat of the European Parlia=ent for 
t!:eir kinC...'1css in giving inforr:;ation and advice. 
• I 
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1:le s!:all discass co~crete proposals for fina11cing against tl".is bac}:grounc! 
of ~t~al i~terrelatior.ships. As criteria are necessary for the 
assess~ent of these proposals, these notes are concerned mainly with the 
searct for rules against which an econc~ically appropriate revenue system 
for tee European Co~unities ~ay be judged. 
In t!:ese notes it is assumed that a growing need for expenditure ~st be· 
covered and that this problem c~~ot be solved sioply by releasi~g t~e 
necessary funds by means of a different expenditure policy. We do not 
go into the question of whether this assumption that there is a given 
expenditure require~ent, which may be considered in con~~ction ~ith t~e 
Popitz and Wagner law, is realistic or whether this development is 
desirable. The question of the methods and licits of greater integration, 
which c~~ be answered in different ways free the economic and political 
points of view, will only be dealt with in passing insofar as it is li=ked 
with financing proble~s. 
The proposed limitations relate to the areas of a European fiscal adjustment 
syste~ within the franework of which the responsibilities for tasks, for 
expenditure and for revenue crust be assigned to the existing levels. Tr.e 
financing of the European Communities is regarded primarily as a prccle~ 
of vertical fiscal adjustment (or vertical apportio~ent of revenue). 
Responsibilities for tasks and fer expenditure are discussed only if ~~eh 
discussion makes it easier to assess the different types of revenue found 
1) 
at Euro~ea, level • Expenditure from the Cor.r.unity budget, with its 
1) An at'te::-.pt to find a basis for the fin[!.ncing sy:::;tern in t::e historical 
-cr::nlle:ls of the dcvelo:;~.~ent of tr.c Federal .Stt!'.te of Ger:::.:;::·: er t::-.e 
i.r:-.erie<.:.n ?ederation of 1781 \:a::; larGely ru2.ed out. See C.~ ;::e:le:::in1 
11 ~-..:.d~ct?oj_itik und Integration., (Euc!c;et Policy a."'ld Intesratic::), 
n?:r.:.._"'lz~~ :.c~:.:-.ie ur:d Hc::uz!:c:J.l tckcr.tro:lc i:;. den :::U.ro:;:~isc~en Ge:::ei::-
sc:-. .::;.ftc:-.11 (?i:l.::nci:.l autcnor:iy 3Ild buc!cetary control i:1 t::-.e E:;::.-c:;:e::: ... :: 
C::~.:.·..::-.::.-::e:::), Co::.c.-:le 11?E:5, ;:;? h9 et sec:q,!':"o::.-c :;:articu:!.s.rly ~ • .::c:-_-:~:der~ 1 
''~er ~e:;-:sc~e Zollverein als historisctes Vorbild einer wirt:::c~~!t:ic~en 
I:-. ':2.::--:.. :io:-1 i.!". :Suro~~11 ( T!:e Gcrr.:a"l C~!:itc:::s V::ic:: c.s a r .. i!:)to::-ic :1.l ::-.~C.el for 
ecc:-. .: ·:.:: ::::.ccra:ic:l in Euro:;::c), ".:.s~ects finc .. :1ciers et fi:;c<.:::.: ce 
l 1 ~::t(:r~tion ~conc~i~ue ir.ternntion~e" (Fi:lancial ar.d fisc~ as~ects 
of :!.':c~·:-.c.-tio:::il cccnc~.~ic intc,::r:.tior.), Tte H::...;-ue 1')53 (Tr.:..v::..:;x .:.e 
l'~::~t~:ut i::tc~::c.tion~ de finances public:ucG - Trnnsactior.s of tte 
. . . ' . . t ~ . ' . f. ) 1-7 t -l ~ ~ .&" ~::~e::.-::~:~c:.~~ l::st~tu e o. puc~~c ~na:.ce , p~ ~ e seqq,a::_ v.~::.-a_ =u 
Stc:."::er:-·.:err.i,::c::.-c~e, "Gcsctic!:te der Verei::.igten Staaten vc:: ;:..crika" 
(liistory of tte Ur.ited States of America), Berlin 1965, p 35 et seq. 
I 
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different cethods of payment, for instance in the field of social and 
regional expendi tu:-e, is disrecarded 1). Although ..,,i thin t!:e proposed 
definition this thece is part of the traditional subject ~atter of fiscal 
adjus~~ent2 ), it is- in the traditional treat~er.t- only rarely ex~ined 
froo the supr~~ational point of vie~) and has only very recently been 
investigated in relation to the concrete possibilities of fiLancL~g the 
European Co~unities4 ). 
In the follo~ing notes a brief structuring of the problem precedes a 
search for economic grounds for assigning revenue jurisdiction to the 
"Fot.:.rth Level"; at the same time we examine, arnong other things, what 
knowledge can be acquired from an economic theory of federalism. The 
1) See F. Franz~eyer, B. Seidel, "tlberstaatlicher Fir.anzausgleich ur.d 
europtiiscl:e Integration" (Supranational fiscal adjustr.:ent ar.d ;:u:::-opean 
intesration), Eor~ 1976, pp 142 et seqq. By fiscal adjust~c~t 
Franzr.:eyer and Seidel largely understand only European Co~~~~ity 
ex~enditure on regional development prograr:.es (p 176 et seqq); in 
t!:is ccr~~ection see also the critique of the narrow concept by K. 
Sc!-.neider, "Uberstaatlicher Finanzausr;leich ur.d Eu:::-op!!ische Inte~ation" 
(Supra~ational fiscal adjust~ent and European integration), Finar.zarchiv, 
new series, Vol 36, 1977, p 343 et seq. 
2) Popitz says: "Fiscal adjustr.:e::1t (therefore) relates to tl:e state of 
most ter:::-itorial authorities fror:1 the point of view of their acbal 
and desired r.mtual financial relationships11 • J. Popitz, "Der !-<U:-.!'tige 
Finanzausg2.eich zwischen Reich, Lfuldern und Ger:Jeinden" (Future fiscal 
ad~ust!':lent betv:een state, provinces and districts), Berlin 1932, p 1 et 
seq. J..nd Rath says: "The raisin;; of funG.s brines 'n'i th it t!".e ~:::-o't:le:: 
of fiscal adjustment", W. R!lth, "Zt.:ro::>tii.scher Fi:umznusgleict" (European 
fiscal adjustr.:ent), 2nd edition, G~ttir.gen 1953, p 5. 
3) See vi. :.lbers, 11Steuer- und F:inu.nzprobler.:e in eine::J Ge!"'1ein.sa:-:en P.nrkt", 
(Frotle::.s of taxation nnd financir.t; i:1 a Co:.."':on J..ar~:et); \·i. G-::rlof: and 
F. ::eu::ark ( ed), "Handbuch der Fin&.!'lz· . .;issenschaft" O~anual of t::e 7neory 
of :r-utlic Finance), Vol IV, 2nd edition, 'l:'Ubir.e;en 19t5, pp 3?2 et sec:a; 
'i' t.'e 1 'e.,. ll"t:';.,~~..,.auc~leich (I)" (F'ccal ~-4i·,c-tr-e"'t (I)' ~~~--~,.l,.u~•e.;.'h,uch 
-• r~ -- ... ) ..,- -•.;.C ..... ~£J - 0 ... • .._._. a"""'~"""'"-' • . .... ) , ..... ;::.. ........ :.,;.; ..... • _. .&. 
de:- :::oziah:issenschaften" (Co::1cise Guide to tl:e Social Scie:-:ces), Vel 3, 
Gu .. +"r-e,... 1~:.::::, p r::.'·6 et sea· al ... o +'he""-" ~- ... ,..o.,~ .. .,t~o"' ne""crt cf" t""e Vl.""..L. .... (.) •• :,.v./! ./..,. .. t _-..,~ ¥·- -~ .A.o.c......i., • .&..l.J..-t..o. ..... .I. .,"'\ ...... - •• 
-~"" '~· . 1 C ·t• ('' ~-..-'.· Co--it+ e) -::..., . ., ~-;, 1::.(2 ;..;,....., _s.;.c ana : :::..r..:::.nc:::..a or.~.'ll~ vee .. eu ..... :.... ,.. ..~ .. - ve. , ·~-se__ / ~ ' 
-;::25 et seq- a.~d K. Rcc!i::'lc, "Z.ur Proo::.e~at:.k eir:.cs Fir:.ar.za'.,;,.s::eic:.s in der 
~--~-~1-l".-c'r;.. ,...,.,_c'"''"'C\..--f"•" f""'~c Prob1 c~s o~ ~".-ca1 '..li''St,..e"'• ~.., .. \.,e 
-:...·""'.;t..:.-- -~· .... .' .. .., ..,;:L. ••.a...J L~~ ...... \..L.•• .., •• ... .r.._._. ..... 1'\I..A'"',...., •• ••"" -·.1. wJ.~ 
.C:".1:-c.:-c:...."1 Co:-.:~'.lni ty), H.v .d. Groeben, H. L~ller (ed.)) 11~-:~c:;lic!-... i-:ei ten und 
.... :--:r:zcr. c:..ncr Euro_rt!isc::en 'Cnion" ( C_rportt.:ni tics and Li~i ts of a Europe~ 
Union), Vel 2, Eadcn-Badcn 1077, pp 2C3 et seqq. 
4) ~cc: ?c;:,::r~ of t!.c Co-;;ittee of Experts for c::-:::J.::-:ination of ::~c f:..:nctio::1 
o: ~~~:ic finJnces in Z~ro~e~ ir.tccration, Vol I, Gencrul Re;or:, 
:.:--..:::::e:..s : ;·77, pp 71 et se~ and Vol II, "Ein::clbei tr!:!c:;e u:::d ;::ei tsu::'lter-
l.:.cen" (I:::dividuul. Papers and V/orking Doc-...::!ents), Erusse::..s 1977,pp 520 
et se~q,(referred to in the following as the MacDougall Group, Vol I or 
Vol II). 
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applicability of the criteria ~~d principles of r~tional revenue or 
tax syste~s to Co~~unity revenue is examined before the arcu~ents 
relating specifically to integration take the foreground. The central 
ther..e is "an approach to integration" in the context of which the 
integration process is analysed first as regards the effects of adjust~ent 
on the member countries and then in relation to its demands on future 
revenue from the standpoint of the new level which is being created. 
Because of the i~portance to integration policy of the redistribution 
bet..,.een the r:.ember States, the revenue syster:1 cust be regarded as a 
par~eter of regional redistribution. In this context we get ~~ analysis, 
with reference to revenue, of current financial relationships between the 
Co~~nity funds and member countries which often ends in an uncritical, 
"cru::eralistic" determination of the net flow of tra.~sfers between the 
Cor.r.runity funds and the member countries. ~lliile exa=.ining the 
sibDificance of these analyses, the question arises of possible 
further-re~ching research to determine the force of Cor:1r.unity revenue 
for redistribution between the countries in the context of a "functional" 
approach1). The last section of this chapter contains a sunmary of tr.e 
criteria for assessing the future form of the revenue syste~ of a public 
sector for the ~ember States which is being expanded anq/or restructured. 
~e last chapter contains co~~ents on the continued development of the 
European revenue system in relation to integration; here concrete 
financinb proposals are exa~ined on the basis of the criteria developed 
in the preceding chapter and a new proposal is put forward for 
discussion. These considerations, based on selected financing 
1) On 'this distinction see \-1. Scheper, "Gesa':'lb:irtschaftlic!:e 
TT~ve.,..+-e' 1 unrsef~e1r ... e de'" ·-r-- .. ~o1.;tl'1r" (":"co ... O'"'l·c .,..e.J.;s ... .,..;...._., ... .:on 
"""•·· ...... -- c .... -...... • r .. b ~!-" -- •• .J •• ...... • \..!.• w ... _...,~~o..-
ef:cctS of asricu~tural ~olicy), Paper fer the ~~ual Confere=ce 
of tr.e Association for Social Policy, 1978, duplicated in 
car.uscript fo~, p 11. 
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instr~~ents, beco~e more important because, under tte current financing 
arra."lge::-:ents and with the number of Hember States in 1979, the financial 
reGources of the Co~nity will be exhausted at latest at t~e tebi~-"ling 
of the 1980s1) and Europear. integration will therefore reach its li~its 
on the financial side2). For these reasons too "it is to be ex::;ected 
t~at t~e finances of the European Co~ities will becoce increasingly 
i::portant"3) 4). 
B. T~e cevelop~ent of rules for assessing the financing of the Eu~opean 
Co:"":.~::·li ties 
I. TbJee levels of an~roach to the nroble~ of finance 
A distinction should be made between tr~ee levels of approach to the Froblec 
of fina"lce which has to be solved: 
1) the a.ssi~ent of revenue responsibilities to agencies; 
2) the selection of types of revenue; 
3) the definition of a European fina"lcial constitution in the context 
of integration. 
1) This state~ent is true even if we consider the budget fo~ecast fo~ the 
Co::-:;,~~ities (1979-1981); this is not based on a si~ple extrapolation of 
expenditure in 1973 tut is associated with a more definite hypot~esis 
havir.3 the object of curbinb a[ricultural expenditure. Cor.:.ission of 
the :SUropean Cor.u":lUni ties: TrJee-year financial forecast, 1979-1920-1931, 
Suppler.ent to Volu~e 7, Individual Plan III, 1978, p 11. 
2) For this reason at the end of I!ove:nber 1978 the Co::-u-::ission of t'!:.e lliropean 
Co~7.~nities ~Jb~itted to the Council and the European ?arl~~er.t a 
r..~::-.cr::.C:::::: concer::1ed with possible ways of fina."lcing the Co:-~':':t:.ni ties in 
t::-.e futt.:.re a"ld. invi tine t:he J.:er.:ber States to discuss t~e pro"t:::.e~. 
_, 
)) 
u' .)
Ece: Fin~"lcing t~e Co~:::unities' Budget - fu~~re ~ethod, Eu~opean 
Cc::-=.unities Bulletin, Annex 8/73. 
:.. :-:1:5::.:.er, Zuropea."l Cor..:::-...ni ty( ies) appears in 11 Eand·.,~rterbuch der 
·.-:irts.::hd~!:'tlissensc:::aft" (Concise Guide to Econo~ics) (}:a."luscri:::t p 63). 
'::.:: ':(::-.-.u:-.:. ':y b'..ld:et ic C.ccu;.cntcd in .Ar.ncx I:; t:r.i.:; \·!ill c: . .:-.t:.e t!:c 
re.:::.ccr ·.:::-.c :.~ less ... -ell i::!'or::-:ed about the present systcr.J of iin~cino 
~~e Co~:.~~i~ics to f~7.iliarize hi~~elf with an analysis of ~~e ~cc~e a,d 
str..!cture of the Cor.~-::uni ty budget as well as wi t!l the 11 0\,'n resources11 
system a.nd 11 fund financing". 
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The different levels are intended to ~ake it easier to assess existi~g 
theories, knowledge and attempts to find solutions in relation tc the 
financing problem we have to analyse. If in what follows we eY~~ir.e 
what contribution can be rnade by the theory of federalism, a tr~s!er 
of the criteria and principles of rational tax syste~s to the ".Fo~th 
Level" and a viewpoint geared to integration to the develo;:::ent of 
specific criteria for the asses~ent of a European revenue syste:::, we 
~ust expect differences in the derivative rules of assessment agai~st 
the background of the problem which has been outlined. 
The first level of the problem appears when we enquire into the cocponents 
of revenue autonomy and when there is an assignment of reven~e 
responsibilities to levels. ~le might then look for econor.!ic reasons 
for greater centralization on the revenue side of a public sector the 
structure of which is changing. The concept of centralization or 
decentralizat~on can be linked with the concept of a jurisdictional 
struct~re which in reality can be described on the basis of existing 
reven~e adjustment systems and can be analysed according to the object 
and the exerciser of revenue jurisdiction. To the question, "Assig:-.r:ent 
to who::::?" the answer is either to the Cor:1munities or to the He:::ber States, 
and to the question "Assignment of what?" the answer usually takes the 
form, in the case of revenue, of a division between revenue-collectin; 
jurisdiction, ad~inistrative jurisdiction and legislative jurisdiction 
("object jurisdiction"), with the latter further subdivided into the power 
to fix tax rates and the right to deterr:1ine the basis of assess~ent. In 
a profile of centralisrn, therefore, we find that fiscal adj~st:::ent 
arran[el':lents tend to reflect revenue-raising autcno:::y. 
the assi~rnent proble~ in its basic for~, no further differentiation being 
~ade between fiscal adjustment syste~s and the object1). 
1) See :::a:-ticulc.r~y G.F. Erc.:::J.:, "Intert;o"~:ern:::ental Fisc?.l .F:elat:.:ns in 
t:-.e ::n~ ted States", ~·/ashinctorc DC 1967, Chnpter 2, end F. ?c:-<:e, 
"G~ndc~tzc der Zuor~~unc ~ffentlicher ~kono~ischer ~~rJ.ticner. i~ 
:R:...::.:-.cr. von Gebiets:r.t:!rper::cnafter." (Principles of assig:;_:::e!"lt of pub:::.~c 
econc~ic functio!"ls in the context of territorial authorities), 
:·:ac:;o._..t;all Group, Vol II, pp 369 et se~q. 
I 
i 
' 
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Dia~ra~ 1: Assig~~ent of aspects of revenue jurisdiction to Euro;ean 
Cc:::-.:::u!'li ties (EC) and t~er.:ber States (!·!S) in vertical fiscal 
adjustr.:ent systems 
Fisc~:!. Syste:n of Eixed syste~ Di ·~·idee s·:ste::: 
I 
·' 
ad~~st:::ent assit;n.-:-:ent Tax-shafing :--... Ear::ar(.e:! systeo ''frcr:-: the Surcl:arge z,ct ear-(tax pool) system / 
' 
a:arked 
.:..spect bott or.: T-ype '.J::,.·pe 
of up·..tards" and fixed, 
jurisdiction rate rate fixed free 
EC JI.S EC JI.S IX; KS :EX: 1-:.S EC ,.,.. ~-.;;;; ~ 1-:..S 
Legislative 
jurisdiction 
-
ever basis of 
assess:-:1ent 
-
ever a s!'lare in 
tl-.e basis of LVoir originay 
assessr.:ent 
Juri:;diction over 
revenue-collection 
Jurisdiction over 
i:::;ler.:entation 
Apart fro:-:1 the question which aspects of revenue jurisdiction should be 
tr.e concern of the Co:-:lmunities, we arrive at the second proble:-:l level 
which differs from the search for a suitable fiscal adjustr.ent system 
1) in that concrete types of revenue are now sought • Should the 
Cor:-.::uni ty be financed l:y means of credits, charges and/or taxes e.nd "'hat 
connection is there in the different systems of vertical distribution of 
reven'.!e !letv.·een the funds accruin€; to the Cor..r::uni ty ar.d the types of 
reven'.!e? At this level it becomes clear that the integration cf revenue 
is net necessarily a matter of allocating additional funds but rat~er of 
r.:akir.z a different allocation of the existing funds of all the Cc~~~ity 
cour.tries. 
1) Fer tf.is c::;tinctien see also H. Bickel, "Der Finan::aus;leic!:11 (?is;::al 
adju~t;e:l t); ·.·:. Gerloff and F. Neu:-:1nrk ( ed), "Handb':..:ch :!er ?i::a.J.::-
. -~~"'"~ ... c..,.- .... " (''-"'ual of the T"eo ... y of Puh1 ..;c -:;-.;r...,,...,co) \~o, TI 2.:~c. tJ-~--- .. ·- ... -..... ..·."""""'· • .... ... ~...... • .. ·~· .... ' - • ' ... 
editio:1, ~=i~~en 195t, pp 744 et se~and r 7~9 et se~ fer t~e ro!itical 
aspect of fiscal adjust~ent, which is· also e~p~asizcd tere; see also 
H. l:ialler, "Die Steuern" (~axes) , 2nd edi tio:1, 'r.!bir.gen 1971, ~ 2C. 
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The third and perhaps ~est important proble~ level is to be found in 
the CC:l.."lection between the det;ree of integration and t!'le fiscal aC.~ust::-:ent 
syste~. Vertical apportionr.ent of revenue depends partly on the delree 
of integration; Custor.:s Union, Common Market, Eccno:-::ic and l-:o~etary Union 
and also a political union are characterized not least by different 
syster.:s of fiscal adjustment because of different fiscal needs. ~:.e 
prot:e~ of a future European fin~"lcial constitution can also be fitted 
into this integration relationship. On the way to econo~ic and ~cnetary 
union closer cooperation between the member countries and the Co~~~ities 
c~"l be orga"lized in different ways. Progressive integration de~~~ 
co~~on legislation in which the institutions of the Co1.c.unity wil: play a 
different part depending on whether we are working to.,.·ards a federation 
or a confederation1). A more federal solution to the proble~ of a 
cor.sti tut:.cn for the Co::-_r::uni ties v:ould include further development of the 
~Jrope~"l ?arlia7.ent so that it becarr.e an international char.ber, whose 
decisions v.'ould be subject to the approval of the Council of r-:inisters, 
which ::-:isht develop into a sort of Cabinet. The governr.ent of the 
Cc::-c.unities might emerge from the Com:-::ission. In the case of a confederal 
constitution for the Co1.~unities, as preferred by the French, gover~~ent 
functions might be allotted to the European Council, for which no provision 
at all is r.:ade in the Co!':'M":'luni ty Treaties; the Councils of l·~inisters "Would 
becor.:e specialist cabinets a"ld the Commission would cease to be an 
initiating institution and would becor.:e the administrative and 
i~ple~entir.g body. In this r.:odel the influence of the Eurc~ean 
Farli~ent would not increase, even as a re~Jlt of the elections to be 
held in 1)79. Finally, the financing of the Co~r::unities r.:ust also be 
consicered in the political context of integration; the fiscal ad:ust~ent 
syste::-: will be deterr.:ined by the political solution to the constitutional 
\..." 2) pro .... J.er.: • 
1) ::Ln t:-.:.~ co:-.nection see H. Scr..neider, •::. ~·:cssels (ec), ";,uf d€::: ·,:e;:e :;-.;r 
i:;.;rc;:lii~:(;:-.en U::1:..on? Diskussicnsbeitrtlce zu:-:-. ':'i::de:::c:.s-Eer:..c:-.:" (Cn t!::e 
-...·-s~· to ~:.:::-o;,ea."l Union? Papers en the ':'indc::iar.~ Rc~ort), Bcr-"1 1977, 
also ".::·~ror!iische Union 198011 (European Union 1920), Eonn 1970, p 10 et 
se1J. ..;.::d H. Cberreuter, "Ka."ln der F.::tr2..:l:.ientc:..ris:::'..lS t!:::cr:e:"::e::? Eu:-.d -
I.JI..::cer - Euro-oa" (Cn..."l Pn.rlic.;::ent curvive't Federation - Countries -
Eurcr·c)", 2nd. edition, Zuric:r. 1978, particularly p 74 et seqq. 
2) Se.; also G. Scr:.!:Hders, "Finan:z.politik" (Financial Policy), 3rd edi ticn, 
Eerlin 1970, Chapter 2. 
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II. Ecc~o~ic reasons for assigning revenue jurisdiction to a tig~er 
le·:el 
There are two rnain objections to using the theory of federalis~ as the 
basis ~or designing a rational revenue system for the Euro~ean 
Co~.r.runi ties. 
~~e first objection is that constitutior.ally the Europe~~ Co~~u~~ty is 
not a federation; at present it is a supranational association of 
sovereign states in the form of a "Co::ll'~on t•:arket", with no unifor:: 
currency or lav:s, so that at best we can s,eal.c of er::bryonic federaliso 1). 
If we nevertheless atter::pt to cite argur::ents fror:: the econo~ic t~ecry of 
federalisr., it is because the ~ain problem with this theory, ie the 
prcble::: of assigning powers to "upper" and "lower" levels, also arises in 
co~~ection with the Europe~~ Co~r.unities' po~:ers in relation to the revenue 
side of the Co:::~nity budget. \·le therefore have to ask whether t!le 
ar5~r::ents put forward for centralized and decentralized solutions to the 
probler:: of finance can supply any guide to the formation of a rational 
revenue system for the European Communities2). 
This for:::ulation of the probleo in itself raises the second objectior. 
to the application of the federalism theory to the revenue side of the 
Cor.~nity budget. This is because, in attempts to solve the assis.n=ent 
of jurisdiction problem within a multi-level financial manage=ent syste~, 
public expenditure is in the foreground and revenue -with a few 
1) See J.:. E::-.crson, "':'he Finances of the European Cor:.:uni ty: A Case 
Stuc:; in :::::-::::ryo!'lic Fiscal Federal is:::", ·.:.E. Cntes ( ed), "':he 
Fa:: ticnl Ecor.o::1y of Fiscal Federalis:::", LexinGto:1, }:ass 1977, 
p 12? et seqq. 
2) :Fe:- t!:is ec:mc:::ic vievJ cf fecer:1lis::., see also v:.E. Cates, ''?~.seal 
:-(·::er::.lis:::", i·!e·,, York 1}72, p 16 et sec_q and 3. Dentc~, '':?~::a:.::­
:~::::.eralis~s und C.er Haushal t der Eurc":l!iisc!:en Ger::eir.sc!:afte::-." 
(F~~cal federalis::: and the budbet of the European Co;.=.~nit~es), 
Integration, ~o 1, 1979, p 11 et seq. 
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exceptions1) -tends to be handled on a classification basis i~ 
dete~ininG fiscal adjust~ent syste~s. 
Against the background of the discussion on econo~ic federali~, we 
~ay therefore exaoine whether (a) a greater degree of cer.trali~ on 
the revenue side is justified and (b) such justification is co~?atible 
with a specific allocation of revenue responsibilities at Co~~ity 
level. 
T:.e eco~o~ic justification for more centralis~ on the revenue side ~ill 
be exa~ined briefly on the basis of the following ar~ents: 
1) sav~ng of costs in the collection of revenue, 
2) fi~~~cing on own responsibility, 
3) supraregicnal tax effects, 
4) avoidance of great regional variations in the yield fro~ 
d t 2). uty or ax 
Savings o: costs in the collection of revenue ~ay occur where there is 
a higher degree of centralisrn if for technical reasons taxatio~ an~or 
bcrrO\·ling lead to a greater net fiscal yield. v&ere the ciistri~~tion 
of responsibilities is the sar.e, savings can be achieved by centralizing 
1) ¥.ere or less on the principle of "Fiscal Equivalence"; see ~!. Cl son, 
~~~~e Principle of 'Fiscal Equivalence': The Division of ReS?o~sibilities 
a:"".ong Different Levels cf Goverr.:rent", The Ar.:erican Eco~c:::ic Re·;iew, Vol 
59 (1~~?), ;:. L79 et seqq; printed in Ger:-:an under the tit::!.e "i)~s 
Prinzip 'fiskalisc!:er Gleichhei t': Die Aufteilung der Verantv:c::-tu~g 
Z\:if:cr.en verschiedene~ Regie run& se ben en", G. Kirsch ( ed), "?!)C.eralis::us", 
.Sbttra::-t 1?77, pp C6 et seqq; see also R.L. ?rey, "Z·::isc::e:-. 
?~~e::-a2.::.s::-Js und Zentralis~.us" (Eeb:een federalis::: and. ce::::t::-2-::.is:::), 
=e::-~e ~977, :pp 93 et seqq, a1:d H. :!~usch, "Tendencies in ?iscal 
Fecerali.sr.:", H.C. RecJ.:tem;nld (ed), "Secu::.c.r 'l'rends of the Fu':lic Sector, 
:r~ceed::.::::gs of the 32nd Congress of the Internatio~al Instit~te cf ?uclic 
:Fi::::a."'lce'', ?aris 1978, FP 129 et seqq. 
2) Sec r; ~er t~e crite~ia of procedural policy; nccc::-diLG to ~ic~e: 
t<::-:es :::!-.-:ulC. be subject to central contro::., "they de:;:-c::d en t:::e .ctate 
of tte r:--~i.:ionnl eccnc::-.y ns a ~·hole or, conversely, ~ . .:;.,ve a C.~~;:~-.:::~-: 
e:fcc~ c~ it and are t:::ercfore particularly suit~~le &S a ~e-~=-~~ir.; 
inst~:::-.-=-r. ...... 11 • ,. n~c'-'e1 ""'er Fi .. an .. "'US,...,e.;c\. 11 (":;"'S"", :..:",.; ... __ ..., ..... ) 
-- - ••• ~- lt. .... , .-I "'"' -(,...o. (,.)..&..- •• .. ... "-~ ....... .,.; __ ................. ' 
:1. J.::::-lo.:f.:f ar.d F. ::eu::-.ark (ed), ".:!ar.dbuch cier .?i~~=\·:isse::sc::-.a:::"t 11 C<a."'l".lal 
.... ... • r.· ~ F bl . ~. ) Vol I... 2 d d. . • · , . ... ..... 1.. :<. o. ~ne .r.eory o. u -~c ~1nance , ~, ~ e ~ ... :on, ~oc cl ... , p 1 ~; 
r.e also ~akes a distinction between econo~ic, fin~~cial and. ~olitical 
criteria; ibid, pp 748-751. -
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~~e a~:~istrative authority1). 
'!'he p::::-i:::ciple that each level r.:-..1st fimJlce its tasks en : -:s o·.m 
rcs::cr:si cili ty ("fiscal respo.::1si bili t~·") leads to t:-:c re·:c.c::1e a~ tcr:o::::;: 
o: a:: te:-:-itorial authori:ies or levels ar.d thus tc :t.e C:i•1iC.eC. E:·s:e-. 
Re2.~ted :o the Co::~.o::'..l!li ties it \!O~ld :::ean a great ::eas·~::::-e of ~ e~t::-: ::..izat:.c~, 
,. 
!'or as c.t the ct!:er levels, c.ll :;:,oHers \t:c:lld ::::-est v:i t!-. t!'.e: Se::-.-:-~:-.: :.ies-; 
p::::-ict:-ad~~st:::ent levies where we ::r:ve an earrr.arked divided ~yste::. 
T~e eco~o~ic reasons for a great ~easure of fiscal respGnsiDilit:r a~ t~a 
c.:ffere:::t levels can be deduced from the link bet\t;een t:!:'.e cc;re.: c: 
a1.4t.::~c-j· a::d awareness of costs at governr.1ent level. A la:c;e :::e::J.s-1::::-e 
of fi~cal respor:sibili ty creat0s better conditions fo::::- a ::-.c::::-e e::c::.:.::::.c:::._ 
:;erfo::::-:::ar:ce of tasks t!:a11 a syste::: of fiscal adjust:::ent ·..,::. t:.: le~.:: ~.-.. r:c:.o:::-y 
~' i~ \·.1hich other bodies pay, in other words a form of cost rcir.-.t:::·~e::e::~;". 
At Cc~:::u~ity level, a gre&ter :::easure of fiscal responsibi2.ity i~ 
:~:..na:.ci:lG r.:it;ht well be a spur to the fulfilr:1ent of tasks ::-:ere i!1 line 
v::i th r.eed4), which does not have to be guaranteed to the sa:::e extc!'l:. i::". 
1) For ccnernl co~::-:er:ts on the tax collection costs bo::::-~e d:::::-ect:~ ty t!:e 
ad::'linistraticn sec F. Heu:::ark, "Gruncstltze gerecr.ter ·.:·'le! t!~:o::c::-:i::c:. 
raticr.a::.er Steuerpclitik" (Princi:::;2.es of fair and ecor:c:-ical2.y ::::-;;;tic:::al 
tax policy), TUbir:;:;en 197C, :::; 372 et seqq, and with s;ecial re.fere.r.:e to 
t!:e ccsts in rel<tt:i.cn to 2.evels, tr.e fiGUres given t:.- · ..:.:=:. C:-.te.s, 
"Firw.:::::.-~·t!ce::::-s:lis:-:t:s in T:.'1eorie unci Fraxis; Ler.:cn fti::- i:i.e :.·..:rc:;:ti:.sc::e 
Ge:..e:.!1sc::aft 11 (i~Gc~l fe::iernl:i.sr.: in theory and :;:::-act::.ce; lessc::-.s :c::::-
tl:e :S:.:ro:::;ea . ."l Co:"'..:::~.;::. ::.:, I.ac.Loucall Group, Vol I!, }" 32C :::.nd :::e 
lite:::-ature cited t::ere, also A. Ereton, A. Scott, 11 ~::e :=:cc:r.or::.c 
Cc;..stit~t:i.on of Fc:ir::rnl States", ~c::::-onto 1978, p 106. 
Cc:-.:::~..:r.i :~t '.:e=:-e to f:~~.::ce: 
11 :rc:-: t::s- to~ dc· .. 'r .. , .. ·E:.~ct=u. 
the :ower levels within a systc~ C .... --! ..... ~ ..  c...-_ ... __
i.:: rc:~::.cn to :ir..:-~:.ci:-.. c c:..r.d ~·:-... :..1 cc.s~.s 11 in the s::-.. :. .. .::c:-:· s:.:.:: . .:~.s 
i:-.. E·~'!"'~:.r.':e, is st:..::_ ,...:~e d.:.::::.c~:~ "to cx2...'7iine e~::::.~:.c.:.2.~:: :.:--. ·.~.-= :E.3e 
c: ;:Ql:.::.c:..: c..:-:::o:-'::.:.0~, .. lt::s:..:::: cA~e~ience o: :.:::2 :·:c~;::::..:. :--:..:.:--.::::"..:-.~ 
,...[ ·,.· ~~--::.:·.'S :::e cor:r.~c~io:;. ·~ct·-.~e!1 tte !"'..?fund of ccs:s :.::c: :>.e S~~· .. ::: ·>: 
:. ) ~er:. "'• :::.~~ ... ~::·:.::: ·.'!"::?' c.:s B::e::·.t::..:.c::-.en .3c::tors «~=.:; v"'.: ::o··,.·:::-~ -~ ·:<·::.. :..::-.. -:: 
_.:..:.::
11 l':."?:r. 2:!...:':.ci ::--.. c:· o: .... :.:·.c ~:..:~::c ~ectv!"' !re::: t~.e :--~:.::t ::· ·1:c·: "): :;· .. e: 
::··:.:::::~.. -;.:.:.::.::-~·:·, .::..::-.~· :.:._:_._:·i!" .;:-:c. ..:eit.::c:'l.r:.:t fU!"' ,~:c:..:..:·.:..~:.::c .. :;:-: '...:..· .. c. 
2~.:.::.:;t:..:A: ~:·.-::.~s ~:.:..;.~:-.~ =:f ~cc.:-.. .:..::.ic:: c..::d .Statistic~;, :.o 3, ~:..·(2, 
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the case of general grants fro~ the lower levels which are typical of 
tne financial contributions from the cecber countries to the Co~~nities. 
There are licits to the wish for fiscal responsibility if the asses~~ent 
bases are inadequate and therefore taxes have to be coordinated. These 
solutions do, however, per~it of financing cethods which would allow 
direct de~a~ds on the taxpayer. 
In accorda.~ce "ri th a decand · .. :hich is frequently mentioned in regard to 
efficiency in allocation and is related to the free-rider proble~, those 
who benefit fron public services should be those who pay for the~. This 
concept, like the de~a~d for responsible fina~cing,is based on the 
principle of "fiscal equivalence", which says that supraregional spillovers 
of be~efits and costs should be avoided. This suggests that in the case 
of external effects reaching beyond the frontiers in the fulfil~ent of 
national tasks, s~prar.ational solutions may be necessaiJ·1). If taxation 
produces supraregional effects, it suggests that supraregional agree~ents 
~ay be necessary. There would then be cause on the revenue side for an 
"upward shift" of responsibility if, in the case of taxation, there had 
to be regional passing on of tax or "tax e:xporting"2) and tl:ere was no 
co~pensating contrary influence on tl:e expenditure side. A de::.and r::ight 
therefore be that tha jurisdiction for taxes with supraregional incidence 
should also be orger.ized on a supraregional basis and various for::.s of 
horizontal and vertical tax coordination would have to be considered; 
such agree~ents require a rnore central division of autl:ority than would 
1) See r.:acDcusall Group, Vol II, pp 379 et seqq and Vol I, pp 49 et seqq; 
in the latter passace (p 4<)) t:!"le "externality or sp:.llover" criterion 
is a~plied, ~here certain policies cut richt across all (or sc~e) 
1-:e:-::"'::Jcr Stde.s and it \•:ould ce i~practicc.ble or u::desirable to :.:a:~e any 
atte.:;;t to li:::it these tra."lsnational effects or to control t!'.e::: at 
natic!:.:J. level. 
2) R. :::ef:eY.oven E:;;:etJ.:s of t.:lX being ex:;:orted "if t!:e ta.x :;ielc of a 
re~ion (prcvi!:ce, st3te, etc) exceeds the tax perfo~.ar.ce" ••• ~d 
••• 
11~~t of the rccicr..~l tw: yiclC. is not ?~~~:~ced by t::e :-e:::.or: 
::.. t.se::.:". ':"::is si t-..:3:ic!: lccC:.s to :m expn..-:sion o: t!:e lc:islati•;e 
r,".lt!:c::-:. :~· Ll.nd t!:e rcvenue-collecti~g authcri ty be:,·o~d tr.eir c·.:~ 
:rc:~::.cr.s. R. ?ef:eY.ovc:~, "Zur T::corie des Steuerex;:or~::11 ('.:'!:e 
t!:eory of tax exports), TUbingen 1975, p 4 (quotations) and p 9. 
-' 
-13- CT 
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Ttis ~~stificatio~ cf 
greater centralization can also be underpir~~ed for reasons of cc~~eti:ion 
a::d it :::-.1st be established in detail ... .rhich of the po~,o.·ers wi t::in a reve!'l"..le 
arranse~ent need central control in order to eli~inate undesirable effects. 
If, for ex~ple, tax exports and i~ports cause taxpayers to ~ibrate from 
one }:e~ber State to another, and if labour beco~es undesirably ~obile, 
the har~onization of the bases of assessment and rates of tax w~ich is 
co~zidered necessary ea~ only be effected by means of ~.l?ranaticnal 
agree=.ent~to this extent the harconization of taxes always ~ear.s a 
2) li~itatio!'l of the national power to tax • For ex~ple, in the case of 
taxation intended to avoid distortion of competition, the reven~e-collection 
jurisdiction and adr.linistrative jurisdiction eight be left "at the botto::" 
... :l:ereas the object of taxation, the taxpayer a..~d/or t::e rate o! tax could be 
deter::-.ined "at the top113). Regardless of the reasons behind the wish for 
1) In this connection Breton and Scott co~plain of the ar;u~ent in the 
li terat'.lrc "that ~ore coordination ar.:on.; j'.lrisdictio:-.s 'tiO'.l~d a~w:;::s be 
better than less, that is, because it (ie the literature, the author) 
i::-?~icit:y assu~es that the costs of coordination are zero, its treat~ent 
of the assign:::ent ?roble~ is syste~atically biassed to• .. :ards excessive 
iLvest~ent in coordination and in har~onization", A. Ereton, A. Scott, 
"T:-.e Ecc::c~ic Constitution of F.ederal States", loc ci t, p 107. 'l'tis 
state~ent at the sa~e ti~e presents a further justification of fiscal 
res~c::sibility in financing and disengage~ent of the financir~ 
jurisdictions. 
2) hS resards taxes relatinb to products and factors, see ::. t-~de: et al, 
":Eericht der Fachar1::ei tsgrup;e Steuerhar~o::isier..1ng" (.Re?ort c! t:.e ',{orking 
Party CL tax l:ar:::onization), H. v.d. Groeben, H. !·:t;l.ler (ed), "?:eblich-
keiten u~d Grcnzen ei~er Europ~ischen Union" (O~~ort'.l::ities ~c ;_i~its 
of a ~'.lTO?ear. Unio~), Vol 3: "Trar.sr..aticnale Koo;;eratio~, .S'tet:.er-
har::-:onisierung" (Transn.:;.tio~ol COO?eration, tax r.ar:::o~::.zatic::), :Saden-
E~de:: 1976, pp 75 et seqc; cmd pp o5 et seqq, a2.so D. Po:-:.:er, "Z:..:::-: 
Gn::za::;.s_:;leich bei der V~satzsteuer" (Cross-frontier e~ua2.izati=:: related 
to t·..<r:-.cver tro:), F. :Sol::cy, G. Tolke~i tt ( ed): "'•.'irtscl:afts~·:isser:sc!'.a!t 
a2~ 3~:..I!1::!l.::se st.::atlicten Hc-':.C.elnc" (:Scor.o::.ics as t::e ta.sis of ~ovc!'"~:.:ent 
actio~~, dedicated to Heinz Ealler o~ his 65th birthday, ~J;i::;e:: i979, 
p 24) et ~eq_r:. 
3) ::: t::iz cc:-~cction Dosser tti~~s there is a pote::tial :or cer.tra:ization 
tsc~~~e ~n tic c~i~ior. Ce~~cation of the ecc~c~ic sectc~s of ~a:~onal 
t::;::-:es tecc;._es r..orc di!ficu: t \vi th i:1crcasin; eco::c:::ic i:::.e;rat:o:: a::.d 
t~.is ~~o.:.r -::rc::.'.lcc tr.~~:!': :er t:-.c Eu.rc?ea!1 Cc:::~ur:i ty \·:hie:-. c::.:: ':e 
. . . ~ • r c . .. b . t D G )~ " -,... t:H-.. .,.· -•l"'t:"en C.C.::-~_::.:::::-.c~ L"j ~CX::3 0. Q c:::i.U:l~o.·.f uc,:c • • ••·• ...,OS;::,·-~, v-e-~e_~··c.. 
z:~ ::~:~~e~ :ir.:..nz;·irtr:c> . .J.ftl::cr.en Fr:1,r:;e~ i;';l ZuGr~.::-.. -cr:!13....":": :""":~t Cc:r- · .. i:-t-
- ............. -... -- --..:,....,...,, (c::o--· ... _...., c.;,..._ -. ..... oble~s co-n.-.;~~ ..... ..J .;r: c,...-.;,,,..."•~ ..... .., , .. .;~h t"r."' -~··-· ~-t:.··-'-'·· .... __ ,c .J. .. ~"l ... 0 ~-· -. --'-'-~"'- C- ... • '-'••.,--·" ~-~-· ... ... ·" 
::::cc.:-.s:::ic "C'::ior:), Co:-.~issicn of t!i.e EuroFean Cc:.:::u~i ties, "Eco::o:::ic ar.c! 
I:c:-.c:.:...:-? r:::.o::'' t;~c:..:.;; o: experts, L'"J.r-C'?-C~ ZCO!j.O:::ic :::!tcrrc.t:8::. ::..r .. d !.c:-.et~: 
U::io::, 3:-~::;::e:s 1~73, C-III, p 73; D. t:.e~::is 1::y \·! • • ;.::bcrs, \,·~ic~. relates 
:::ere to :~e rotential of decentrn::ization, reads: "t!i.at t~ose taxes in t!i.e 
cc: . .::e o: \·i::-.iC:~ dif:e~ences in application and for::-: ca.,;~e t::e ~::-_al:est cha."lt;e. 
in cc~pctiticn ~ay be left within tl:e cc~~etence of the r.e~ber cc~ntries, 
ha:7.onizatio:n "teing !Jartinlly waived". v:. ;.lbers, "Steuer- und Fina.~z­
-c.rcb"::.e:::e in eine:':l Ge:-.cinso:..-::cn J.:arkt" (Tax a.'1.d fi~a~ce 'Oroble~s in a Co::-.. -::on 
i':ar~~e:), F.e..~dt~c:r. der Finanz\.,rissenscl:aft (l.:anual of tr.e Theory of Public 
~~n~~~~' Vn1 TV. ~n~ ~~~+~n~- 1n~ ~~+ ~ ~a~ 
-14- C':' "IJ.X/279/79-E 
fiscal equivalence, knO\-!ledge of the regional incidence of taxatic::::. is 
one of the basic factors for decisions on centralization1). 
There is ~other reason for centralization if we consider regiona~ 
differences in tax revenue. Revenue fro~ custo~s duties, whicr. for 
gecgrap~ical reasons can only be collected at certain places (frontiers 
v:i th third countries, ports) or which for unforeseen reasons (eg strikes) 
accrues in one country rather thon another, tends properly to belong to 
u~brella territorial authorities, as such fortuitous circu~st~~ces will 
o~y exceptionally be ~atched by an equal expenditure require~ent in the 
region concerned. Even within a custo::!s union, in vrhich the cour.t:-J 
collecting the custo~s duty is not necessarily the country of destinatio::::., 
ttere is a need for resources to be redistributed centrally, or !er tte 
revenue-collection jurisdiction to be centralized. There ere sir.:ila: 
reasons for a central revenue authority \·:!:en the regional distri1::ution of 
tax revenues fluctuates a great deal even thouch the use r.:ade of tax 
opportunities is co~parable and this situation cannot be attri1::uted to any 
given tasks specific to the region. The more one-sided a regional tax 
pro!ile, the ~ore likely it is that this difference has little to do with 
eA~enditure require~ents and if special influences, eg the 1::urden of the 
costs of congestion, are considered, t!:ere see~s to be a case for a =ore 
central revenue-collecting authority2) or some other u~brella financing 
1) .See R. Feffekoven, ''Internstionale Finanzordnunc" ( Internatio::-,cl 
fin~"cial :"".anage~ent), H. Grtber, A • .Sc!:Uller (ec), "Internatio::a.le 
v:irtsc::-.aftsorcL"lun;:;" (Ir.ternaticnal econor::ic manager.;ent), Stuttsart, 
::e'.·! Yor~ ~978, p 123 et seqq, ibid, "Zur '.:'heorie des Steuerex-;.orts" 
(The theory of tax eA7orts), loc cit, p 26 et seqq. 
2) ~!:e ex~C!~le of tobacco duty dcr.:cnstratcs t~~t decentrali=ed 
reve::-.ue-co:..lectin; poHer \·:culd 1:;e of li tt:..e use. Let us assu:::e 
:;-.:;.: :a·;::::.cco producers ere greatlJ· concer;':r:::..ted re;:;ic::ally a;:d 
E:::.t tl:ey l:ave to pass on c.ll tobacco duty, \\hich is ;;;..:,~t::..e 
£;, ... e:'::\.:"..c:-e, to the revenue nut!".ori ties; in t!:e abce:-:cc of 
.s·;.~::--::=ecior:al I!'.ru:nce;--.cnt of t~e rever:'..le fro::: t!"'.e d:..:.ty :. -: \i:c:.12.:. 'te 
~~: :~~:.::· distr:.'b·.lted. See S.J. l:~sh.:{:.!1, 11 Distr:.~::t:c:l c: 
F£:C.~rc.2. ':'[V:CS a:":C!'l~ the St.::te!311 , :!ational ':':lX Jcur!':.:L.., v~,_ 9 ( A.9.56)' 
-~ ,~.Q e._ seco ~"'" Ch l'cTure "T'r." InterC'"._., ... e '::'·,...or•.;.,.._ o.c ~~.a~e !"~J u ~ .. ·' a...:: ... - ••.• .1.) • .t.: • .;;.~ ... '"""""' ~!" v-··o .. -- -
&::C. I.occ.l ':'<:!.xcs: Esti::ates for 1962", ~:ation.::J. Tax .:ourn::L., 23 
(~97C), pp 2C6 et seqq. 
., 
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arrange~ent (eg horizontal fiscal adjust~ent). 
Cn t~e above argu~ents, econo~ic reasons could be fo~~d for a grea:er 
degree of centralization on the revenue side1 ). If no such eccnc~ic 
~us:ification had been possible2), greater auto~o~y of revenue i~ t~e 
Co~~~nity could only have been ur.der~inned politically. 't.'hereas .,,.i th 
revenue autor.o~y savings of costs c~~ be achieved si~ply by shifti~g t~e 
aC..':lir:.istrative p0111ers to a higher level, in the case of the ot!'ler 
justifications the revenue-collection and legislative powers also have 
to be centralized. Exce~t for the de~and for fiscal respor:.sibility in 
financing, the two other criteria fail to produce any s;ecific ccnc~usions 
about an acceptable fiscal adjust~ent system or about concrete types of 
revenue to finance the Comcunity budget3). To this extent the 
"federalistic approach" is found to be only partially able to produce 
ccncrete revenue for the Co~7.Unity budget4). 
1) F. r:e'.lr..arz d.rav1s attention to a "tendency for the relative i::-.portance of 
(ce::1tral) govern~cnt taxation to increc.tse'' a'1d refers to an "~ce-old 
trend to\.,rarcs ccntrnlization of taxatio::111 , which on the 0::1e h~~c. he 
rezards as a cor..scquence of the allocation of tacks to dif!'erc::1t levels 
end on the ot~er ha~d accounts for or. fiscal-political gro~~ds. As 
eviccr..ce r:e:.:.r..c.r~ cites tl:e Federal revenue fro~ taxes as a :;:ro:;::Jrtio::1 of 
t!-.e tota2. taY. :rield. See F. r;eur:Ja.rk, "Gr' • .mC.stltze e;erechter :.:.n:::. ~;.,:o::or::isch 
ratio::aler Steuerpoli tik" (Principles of fair and econo~.ical:y rational 
tax policy), loc cit, pp 10-12; quotations pp 10 and 11. See also 
E. iJeur::rum, "Cor._":lents", H. C. Recktem:ald ( ed), Sec'.l::..ar trends of the 
Fut2.ic Sector, loc ci t, p~ 160 et sec_q, also ;).G. Du.vies, "I::te:r::-.aticr..al 
Cc-::pz..risons of Tax S:ructures in Federal WJ.d tni tetry Cour.:ries'', T"::e 
Australian ::ational Uni Yersi ty, Cer..tre fer Research en Feceral Finru:cial 
Relations, Research l·~ono_:rnT-Jh No 16, Ca.."l"::er:::-a 1976. A dist:-i':"..lticn of 
the tax yic:d nccording to levels of :;;cv;er.s in federations n::::i ~::.::.. tary 
cts.:cs ·..;ill ce found in tte '.!'able, ;..::1r..ex 1. 
2) See o;.l<:=o R.; .• Hussrave, F.B. l·;usgrave, L. Kullr..er, "J:..e ~ffe::.t:ic::en 
F:.:::ar.ze::: i:: ':7.-:.eo:-ie ~nd Praxis" (Public f:.:::D..."lce i::1 t::eory and :;;ractice), 
Vo: 4, TUti~~en 1978, p 157. 
3) Ir. ~!-.i.s co:":.ectio::1 .see R.L. ?r~y, ":·.:iscten [t3dera2.:..s::.us ~:::d :c::tralis::.us", 
( -=.-.+-·•e"'"" zoe-le.,....,l.:.,._ ,,.....l C"'"'.._.,.._,~~-\ 1 CC C.; ... ,......., o-:; e• ee,_,... -.."-~ 
_._.., .• ~ ..... - \.... -"""' ·~··· ~ ... u. ~ .... \,. ........ _~~-l/'... • .... , ...... ~ "'"""' to.. ..... ·:'-.' 
vr-:!.ue-a~::icc tax, exci::e duties, custo::-.s duties <:.::d t!'.e tax:!.::..cn of 
::.:.sine~ses ~e all re~~ded as :e~2r2.l taxes; t~xes i~~cse~ as c ~atter 
o: ::rocedural policy c:.r.d t!ie <:=CC/e-defir..ing la\·:s for t!-.e :~....:::!.::..o::: of 
:::~turnl per.sc:::s also cc~e ~itt:..::1 the co~pcter..ce of :he Fcdc:::-~tic:::. 
::..~~::y, a:ter redistritutior., ~ar?.et-li?.e revenue is net r~:~dcd ns 
tclc:::cir..g to any p~ticular l~vel. 
i..a..) • • 
':'":-.c t:::e.sis ;::.:t for:.:.:u-d ty R.L. Frey ~n cor..::ecticr.. \:i :~ the ::;,~,·:cs ?edc:-nt~on 
c:.cccrdin~ to 1::•ich there should be t;renter centrn:!.iz.::t:..o::1 en the reve::1ue 
side t!-.a..~ 0::1 t::e ex:;:.endi ture side, could. not be nna2.:: .sed in de:.:1il fer the 
Eur~:;:e~ Co~::.unities because the sub~ect was too li~ited; as regards :l:e 
developing level of the Con~ities, the author seeos to thL"lk the opposite 
is ~ore convincing. Ibid, p 97. 
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III. ~e applicability of the criteria a~d principles of rational tax 
s-rste:-:s to the ::::Uronear. Co::-.:-:u~i ties 
~e fi~d further useful info~ation if we examine the adoption of c~iteria 
used to assess existing tax or revenue syste~s. On the one hand tl:ere 
are t:.e general tax principles ~~d on the other the special de=ands ~ade 
o~ reve~ue syste~s by local authorities. 
If a large ~easure of auto~omy (earmarked divided syste~) is de~~~ed for 
f~ture fin~~cing at European level, and if it is also assu~ed - also 
unre~:istic at prese~t - ttat as re5ards its ai~s and scope the D~ropea~ 
budget is co~parable with the national budgets at federal level and fulfils 
the tr~ditior.al tasks of allocation, distribution ~~d stabilizati~~, 
tc.xation !Jrinci:;::les could be used to assess the types of tax. T::is 
stipulation is necessary because in fiscal adju~t~ent syste~s with a low 
level of autono~y for the Coc~nities direct reco~rse to the ta~ayer is 
out of the question and in the grant syste~, for ex~:;::le, in the ~~ro:;::e~~ 
Co::-:.:~::i ties vie have financing by contributior. rather t~an by ta..xation. 
It wou:d therefo~e be prerr.ature, especially at present, to adopt tte 
c~iteria of a rational tax system at European level. It is ~ore i~:;::ortant 
to analyse the specific de~ands ~ade of a European revenue syste~ (see IV). 
Tr.is is done on the supposition that they do not on the whole coincide with 
tr..e general principles of taxation and ~ay even be in co~flict \·Ji th the:::11). 
Independently of the discussion on econo~ic federalis~ and the ap:;::roaches 
~ l't' al . t t t~ f l't' , . t t' 2 ) o~ po ~ ~c sc~ence ex:;::er s o a l~eory o po ~ ~c~ ~n egra ~on 
there is, particularly in the Gerrr.a~-la..~guage countries, an i~tensive 
1) .Such con!'lict.s ~a:; also occur in a cc:"":r;arison 'beh.'een the general 
criteri~ of rational tax policy and the special rec~ire~ents of local 
govern:::ent tax .syste~s. 
2) See J • .; • Ec.sse ( cd), "Poli tiY.verflec!: tuns i::: ftlC:.cra :i ·:e~ St:::.e. t" 
( ::c,~ ... ~c-, l·r: ... e_.,..., ... .;o,., .;.., t._.c +"cdc.,...,, ...... -•e) E .... c.·e- o:--.J-.., ~.:~. _c,. 
.. _ .... ""'- .__ .. :... .:..• """'"'.. ...... ..... .... ~ .. - ~ ~ L.c... 4,. , """' ··---L,..t:... , -
~ ,. C"~'h-.,..'"'-r '!:l. t:>,.;cc-er+ ~ ":::c'h,.,a'cc 1 (e...:) "::o'.;+~· .... ,e.,.+"'ec-.. ... ··~~ 
.&. ••• - ........ .~.~ ... ""'., ~- .£..\,;.-..,)- .... , .... - ....... - - ...... t • -·""···· ·-- ........ -~ 
f..r~tii: und Eeric!1te c::.us der Praxis" (Political intet;ratio!l :::I, 
Cr~ti~ue and Repo~ts fro=. practical experience), Krc~bers 1977. 
-
r:, 
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conflict wit~ t~e features of a rational local goverr~en~ reven~e 
system. This discussion might be turned round on the assur.pt~c~ 
that arg'J.t::ents which are "anti-low level" tend to be "pro-.!:ie;l: leve!" 
and vice versa. This would produce a kind of "rever~ed local revenue 
syster.111 for the Coi..r:runi ties. A count of the taxes which, accord::r.c 
to tr.e criteria n~ed in the literat~re, are found to be useless as 
local t~~es (for instance, progre~sive inco~e tax, property tax, special 
excise duties or trade and land t~es with prosressive rutes) 1 ), does 
ir.dded bring evidence of their suitability for fina~cing central 
gover~~ent in a federal state, but not of their special suita~ility for 
financi~g Europenn tasks. And as regards the reversal of the criteria 
for appropriate local taxes, it is doubtful whether it is unreservedly 
use!u:2). In accordance with a reversal of this type Co~~~ity revenue 
should have the follo~nng characteristics: 
1) that t~e e~uivalence principle is not applied; 
2) that the taxes are unnoticed or not felt; 
3) elasticity of yield of <1. 
~bereas these inversions will not stand up to examination3), a different 
situatio~ arises if local taxes are required to show the ~allest 
1) See P.. Ti:::::1, "Gemeindefinanzen I, Theorie" (Local Governr:;ent Finances 
I, T:-.eory), P.ar.dv:t3rterbuch der So=ialwissenschaften (Concise G'.lide to 
the Social Sciences), Vol 4, Gt3ttin;en 19c5, p 299 et seqq; G. Seiler, 
"Ziele und !:i ttel des ko~u~alen Finanzausgleichs, Rcfe::-at ft!r den 
Finanz:·:issenschaftlichen Au.sschuss des Vereins !t!r .Socialpoli tik" 
(Cbjects a.~d resources of the co::;r.nmal fiscal adjust~.e:1t, Pa;.er for 
the Cc::::::ittee of tl:e Sociofolitical ~ssociation on tl:e thec::-y of 
r-utlic fir.ance) 1978, duplicated in r.:anuscript fcrr::, pp 55 et seqq; 
K. l.i t tr..n.:m, "Die Gestal tuns des kor .. -::ur..alen Fi:1~z.sy.:;te:-:s unter 
... -u-o .... ~- .. .,-~~o1 ~t~sc...._e,.., Ges'c'nt"'-u"'' .... e.,.," (M\..e err-,.,.,~ z<> ... ~ c ... o-r ... ..,e 
.. <..:...I .......... '"" ...... c..;.!-' -• .J-. ·• ........ ~ • ~ •• • u-.. \.. .... -·· o~•- .... ""- ·• ... "-'•· 
lee~ gcver~ent fin~~cing syste~ fror.: the point of view of p:ar~~i~g 
rolicy), P.ar.over 1963. 
2) Cr. tte sutject of tr.e criteria \·thich follc• ... · see t!:e EX?ert Cpi:-.ic!': 
d:!ted 16 !:c:.::-c:. 1963 0:1 tte local tn.x systc::: 2nd. lcc:-,1 to.x ref:;:-:-:: in 
t!:£? ?eCer::.l R8?Ublic of Ger:--1a:::t, ":)er 1 •• 'in!:cnsc::a:t:ic:.e ~e:.:--~t tei::: 
2u:r.~e.s:..ir.isteriu:!l der Fina.~zen: :Entsc:-.lie::.sur.c:;en, Stel!'.ln.:;::C::.·.e:: u:-.:i 
G'...!t<.c:-.ten 194)-1973" (Econc:::ic Advisory Cc-..:ncil to tte :F0ce:-c.l ::i::istry 
o: Fi~cnce: Resolutions, co~~ents ~~d e~e~t c~i~io~s 19~9-i~?3), 
Tt!bin;en 1974, pp 4c6 et se~q. 
3) If "VIe only t.!:ir.k of local equivalence by srou::s i:: t::.e cc:::ext o: 
local soverrr.ent, it certainly cannot be ap?lied en a EU:-c~e~~ scale. 
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possible differences in yield per head within local aut~ority areas of 
the sa:::e size. The inversion of this view provides justificaticn !or 
the centralization of taxation \olhich has already been i::porta.I:t in the 
discussions of centralism. If the econo~ic activity underlying 
taxation is very unevenly dispersed, the autono~ous use of this revenue 
by the area 'tlhere the assets are located ca."'lllot be justified on the 
grounds of the equivalence theory nor can it gain approval as re~ards 
the passinG on of taxes to the region. Greater centrolisn in one 
for~ or another would be indicated, b~t a European syste~ wo~ld only be 
indicated i! the t'tlO situations referred to a~su~ed "~rope an proportions". 
Even the \:ish for less sensitivity in local taxes to the cyclical 
econo~ic situation could be applied inversely to the European level, 
but or2y if this was required to exert influence on cyclical trends. 
Thus the 11inverse attitude" is only useful in some cases and even then 
cannot al~ays be applied at Co~~ity level but only serves as a negative 
de:r.arcation. 
IV. Criteria s~ecific to intc~ration 
1. Intecration of revenue fro::: the point of view of the l!e:::ber States 
of the Euro~ean Co:::~nities 
1.1 Proble:::s of adjustr.:ent for f·:e:nber States in the fin~.cing of the 
Euro~e~n Co~~Jnities 
'I'he follov;int; re::1ar:<s are based on the ass-J:.lption that a Euro:;:ea."l. revenue 
syste~ !".~ s:;:>ccial features \o:hich we can deduce fro::: the integration 
context. T~e special features of an integration-oriented revcn~e 
~yste:-: are derived frc:::: the objectives of integration and the associated 
tas~s of the co~7.Unity budget. 
~~ rc:&:~s the finor.cin; of the Co~~unities the procc~s of ir.tezration 
c~ a:so be seen as a procre~sive willincr.ess of t~e ~e~ber co~n:ries to 
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renou~ce their national sovereicnty. The national '1-rai ver of rc..-e~ues 
produces effects which we often fail to analyse in S?ite of t~eir 
sig~ificance for the progress of Euro?ean integration. ?::e effec:s 
of a breater degree of centralization on the Ke~ber States ~~st, 
however, be i~plicated, particularly in recard to the asses~ent which 
has to be made of proposals for a future revenue syste~. The followinJ 
pro~le~s of adj~st~ent will be singled out: 
1) li=itatio~ of the ri~hts of the national parlianent; 
2) t~c effects of federali~ within the State (fiscal adjust~ent 
\!i t:.in t:.e State r::nde r.1ore diff:..cul t); 
3) li~itation of flexibility of nationnl taxation; 
4) effects on readiness to pay ~~d willingness to integrate; 
5) need for harr::onization. 
In ~~alysir.g these re~ercussions, which arise si~ply fro~ the h~~ding 
over of national revenues to the Cor::~unities, the distinction between 
fi:::cncint; by "co::-~-::unalization" and financing by r::eans of "additional 
reso'...:.rces" is ioportar.t because national sovereignty is affected in 
different ways depending on whether the budeet of the Co~~ities is 
fin~~ced at the expense of national bud~ets or in addition to the 
national budgets. In the first case expenditure and revenue are 
passed on "upvrards". ~.'hereas the taxpnyer is not directly affected 
-v;her. fi:::ance is provided by coo~unalization, in the case of the second 
alternative l:e has to r.1ake additional con tri bu tions to>v!ards the 
In the face of these two choices a ?essir::istic 
vieH of national sovereignty r::ight be that the parliar.1ents of t!:e 
~e~ter countries asree to an increase in the Cor::~nity eovcrnr::ent 
1) sh~e ~~d thus increa~e tte burden on the taxp3yer r~ther tt~ that 
ttey renou::ce national ri£hts in favour of pessint; tas.'-l.s ~"ld the 
~:::-c·:isio::: cf fi:::a."lce on u::l\:ards. Tnis hypottesis c~~ elso be 
cc~o~d~rcd in conj~~cticn ~1ith the i~portance of the Europe~ ?a:::-l:a=e~t 
· ..::.::..c::. c: .... :: !::;e c:-.2...~~·2d 'ty ~e.;.::s cf direct elections. It is t::.erefcrc r.ot 
i~poz~itle that ir. the lc:::G ter~ this parliament, in conjur.c~icr. "ith 
1) ':':::: Cc-.:-:t::::: :;:-· :ovcr:-..:-:cnt .ch:u-e c::m be interpreted as t:::e ouct:c:::t 
of t:::c cA~c:::~:.~~=-c of t:::e Cc~~~~ity a.~d t::.e national product of 
t:::e Cc::-.:::·,;..:1~ ty. 
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the various countries, will be able to reach deci~io~s about the re7e~~e 
side of the Co~r.unity budbet. \.Jhether parlia':'lenta:ia.."ls in t!:.e ~:-o:;:ea.'"l 
Farlia-::ent \dll agree to a federal syete::1 rather t~a:1 to a ~.:.:-c:-.a:;e o:-
diviced syste::1 re::1ains to be seen; the for~er as~~es ~eater coc:-d~~ation 
bet\:een the rner.:'be:- countries ~d a bic;:er sacrifice of national :-e...-er:~e 
a:Jtor:c:::y t!'.a."l a fiscal adj~st:::e!'lt syste::: v:hich per::i ts of addi tic::s to 
naticr.al taxes (partial lebislative jurisdiction) or a still hir~er 
reve~~e jurisdiction. This could induce a ~o~ent~= towards greate~ 
re...-e::t:e autono:::y v:!:.ich \ofOUld leave national rights largely unto~c!:ed 1). 
The alternatives of co~~nalization and suppler.:entarJ financing are the 
~bject o: decisions by each ~:eober State itself in the internal process 
of adaptation to the increasing financial needs of the Co~~nities. If 
all the "rationalization reserves" of the ~~e::1ber States are ex.'lausted 
they r.:~st either chan~e the national rates of tax, bases of as~e~~cnt 
or e:(e:-:pticn lir.:i ts or cut their expenditure prograrr.es. The nati.onal 
fecerallstic str~cture and the argu::ents on fiscal adjust::e!'lt are tou."ld 
to be affected by the outcome and it is likely that the smaller 
territorial authorities will endeavour to pass the burden of adjust~ent 
to the federal authority or central gover~ent having regard to t!:e 
traditional responsibility of central government for foreign policy. 
Conversely, the Federal Gover~T.ent will refer to regional accr~als and 
be~efits fro::1 the Co~nity budget and try to persuade the provinces 
and/or districts to stare in the financin~ or ... :ill force the::: to 
participate. The greater the financial burden, the more diffic~:t 
national adjust::ent will be2). These proble:::s 'tJOuld be intcr.s:.:~ied if 
Cc::-:.:-..;:.:. ty reven11e arro:.nt;e~ents were ::Jade which had a direct effect o:: 
tr.e ::1.cticnul division of revenue bet\:een the territorial a:..1thori tics, 
c~ \-:ould be the cnce in the Federal .Republic of Gerr:ar.y if v<'..::.ue-8-d::!cd 
tax \·:c:-e 11ced to ar.y ~reCJ.t extent to finance t:he Co::'.!':':'~ni ties. It v:ould 
t:-aerefo!"e ~e f3.vourable to the develo:;~ent of a Eu.rcpen.n reve=:ue !:::ste~ 
if, ct~·.cr :.:--.:.!:CS tein,: eq~al, a for~ of reven~e \·.'e~e se:ected ,_.:::ic!': v:ot;lc! 
1) fc:- t:..e ::ro':::.c:::, lir.l:ed ·.:i.t:h this subject, of the effects of a 
~..:~:-:: .. ::: ti -:::::1 tn.x a:..: tr.cri ty en the relations:-.:.:: bet,•ee:: t<:.:-: ~....__.:: 
ere~:.: !i::~::ci::1.~ in the ::-e~bcr count:-ies, see H. Giersch (e~), 
"ii: ::!~l;.oli ::.:: :..:!'1::! Glot-Plcteucrun~;" C:Fiscal policy a."ld ove:-o.2.l 
cr:::-;t:::-::2.), ~:-:.r.c;cn '1073, f-P 1~3 c.."ld 137. 
2) .See ciicc:.::::;:::;icn i!'l "Die Zei t", r:o 29 of 8 July 1977, ::o 3C cf ~5 .:"u:!.y 
": ~ 77 ::::.::t. ::c 31 of 22 July 1977, beb.-ecn H • .t.pcl, Fedc:-al !-:i::i:::tc:- of 
.i-'i::~nce, ·.:. ~eisler Kiep, Lar.d l·:ini:;ter o! Finar.ce a:.d }:. Rc::-:..el, 
Cbert~ser=.eister. 
' ( 
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have t!le least possible effect on the federal structures of t!:.e !·~e:::ber 
States. 
But tte prcble:::s of adjust~ent go further than this. Li:;itaticns 
o~ n~tic~~ eX?enditure or losses of revenue not o~ly r~ve fiscal 
effect:; o~ t::.e federal systc:::, they l:<:.vc non-fi::c=2 effects as · ..,.e:.l. 
:~ntio~~ autonc~y suffers fro::: any har:::onization of bases of assess:::ent, 
e:·:e::-.:;t.icn li:::i ts, tax rates, etc, and :proble:c:s arise particularly • ~ 
national opportunities for action are lost in consequence and t~e use 
:::ade of tt~s potential at su~ranational level is either nil or not in 
acccrda::ce ...,,.i th the national way of thinking. For exa=.ple, if large 
proportions of the revenue from indirect taxes (revenue-collectin; 
jurisdiction) pass to the "Fourth level", these funds can no lcn;er te 
used at national level under procedural policy. If the Co~~nity fails 
to take over a ccrres~o~dins function in procedural policy there ~ay be 
a tra::sfer of the public finances re:::e.inir.3 to the country ¥:ith a v:icie 
variety of requirements 1 ) \·Jhich, incidentally, ":::ay r;:ake har!':lonizaticn 
even :::ore difficult if it becomes necessary at a later date. In 
regard to the European revenue system, we might therefore require that 
the choice of one of several financing systems should, other thir.cs 
being equal, involve the least possible limitation of national tax 
flexibility2). 
The acove argu:::ent can be refined if the attitude to adjust:::e~t in 
the integration process is classified by net recipient and net dcr.cr 
cou..'¥).tries. The recipient attitude includes a voluntary or forced 
1) Ir. t::.:s connection F .K. ?·~onn, in his postscri:;:·t to t:-.c :-cprint o~ 
2) 
\...;s ""•..,uc .... ~o.,~·l· ... c'~-cn Tde..,,c" (Ide··1s 1'n t'~c ... - ..... ~-os- •"'x' 
.A:!..L. ,;) ;,.'-- ,. ::' .,.._.""' .._ ..... _ "'"'~ c~... ...£. • • ._~..., ... l... .. wc.o... 1 t 
.s-:ut:~::.:-t 1972., :::al:cs fresh rcfcrer.ce to "puttir.::; :::-::-:.::.c:.::.:. ::-c:!.:c:l 
c:: .:..:: econo:-:ic bn.si:::n n_~d al~o r-;cntio::G "di~:;i:;-:a::..c~ of t:-.. c e::~ct5 
o~· t..-~;:o::;", p 365 et sec:.. 
.... 
.. :.e 
?eCc~~~ ~c~~tlic ~~d tte ~~de~, see Fir.~l Re?ort o: t~e Cc~~is~io~ 
c: =:-.-::u:.r" into Consti tuticr.cl Re for::, BTJ (?ed.era2. GoYer:-.:::ez:.t 
p~t:i~cti~n) 7/5924 of 9 Dece::ber 1976, pp 146 et seq. 
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intecration-oricnted attitude on the one hand but on tte ot~er a 
relru:a~ion of effort; a pla~ed tax increase will not be i::posed 
't.eccuse the ex-tra payr:ent "fro::J the top" ::1akes it unneces~ar;. The 
e!rects of these 'bonuse~ at the Euro"Cean level "'roduce difficult p:-o'o!e::s 
. t' , . f ff. . 1) • '1..1 •• , . • .&" '1-
'l.n ne anu. ..... ys1s o e :..cJ.ency cor.:para ... e Wl. tn those ar1s:..ne; _re:-. t .. e 
e::octive use and ffionitoring of national progr~~~es of regicna: and 
eco~c~ic policies. Net donor co:;ntries tear the fina.."'lcia.l bu:-den; 
t~ese countries will therefore only agree to additional taxes, t~us 
givi.::G a further impulse towards integration, if a cor.:prehensive 
cost-cenefit analysis of the adva"'ltages and disadvantages of Greater 
inteGration produces evidence to show effects which will over-co::pe.::sate 
the position of the net donor ("pay~aster"). 
is therefore the price to be paid for t~e advar.t~es it is toped 
i.::tesration \·:ill bring2). Over and above tr.is the "~a:--::aste:-s'' o!te::1 
tr:r to stipu!ate the conditions for the receipt of pay::er.ts or to ::Me 
thei:- ·,:illingness to pay dependent on the ability to exert sue:-. 
influence. 
7r.e last proble::1 of adjustr.:ent is the need for harr.:onization in all its 
::ultifarious forr.:s. For in~tance, the value-added tax resulations3) 
assu~ed that this tax was levied in all the member countries. 
there was a need for harr.:onization in the establis~:.ent of a co~:.cn 
basis of assessr.:ent by the Cor.~unity and finally the tedious ar.d still 
unfi~ished adjust::ent in the national turnover tax lecislation. 
of reve:::.ue, \·:hich by co::parison need little har::;onization or relate to 
bc..ses of assess::1ent ~·:hich have already been harmonized, exert little 
i.:::::;ence acainst intecration, other thines bein0 equal. In 
res?ect taxi~b t~e brcss national product or taxin~ final co.::s~.ptio::1 
as ~r.~o:- val~e-ndcec tax is et fir~t ~i~ht relatively si~?le, as a 
1) E.;:c ~ri:::~ily R.P. ::a than, ."'-..D. iO:v.I'.vel, E.E. Cclkir.s, ": :oni tc:-in;; ~evcnue 
.::~.:- ~i:-::", ',.'c.::t:.:::-:c~ r:;c 1975 ar.d E.!-:. Gr['~l:.c::., "I~te:r-:,c·-·c:-~:-:'2!1:.~ 
C:-::.:.:.s: ;.. !-:~vie•.! o: the E:::piric.::.l :.iter~ture", ·,.;.;.. Cate:: (c::), 7:-.e 
?::it~c~: =:c~cr.:y ~: Fisc~ FedcraliE~, Toro~to 1977, ~p 219 et se~s· 
··~- ~ '·-e;• . ..,~ ""··~-c:.c .... ~•..,a+- 1 l·c:." T,...~ .... ~rc .... ~ ('7'"') "~- 1 c , ..... ,.: /._ .. ._. ...., • ~ '· ... '..l.-, ....... _......_, •• ••- ~r.-.., ...... ••- .6. .. -..6.-...J .., ._) ......... - 4.,.o.t:_ ....... .... 
:··~-~--"'"''+u.-~.-~r~.,_,.,_..,u (T,.+cr:-c\'C"' .... ~cnt"', tr--"'"'fe"''"- r'--~oc-~"''S , .. 4 
............... __ ,_..,..,. ·•:.-.:.' """....,~~ .• \...: -'-""'""" CJ ....... ~ ~,.._, •.;J ""'"""'v .... .,._ ...... ~.\.4 
:::rc·:::::..c.~·:: o: :or~), r:::::er for ttc Cc~.:-.i ttce of tr.e Socic;c:i ticJ.: 
:.::::-:::ci:t:.c::. o::. t:-.c ttecr:· cf p:.:tlic fi~.::..::ce, "~973, d:.:p2.ic.:.tec i::. 
:-~~:.:==~~~t !er~, ::::P 2? et seqq. 
2) ':":-.e :;::::-:-o::c i ~z..:~.:er.tJ.t:c~ is a.:::>plicable not only to t!:e cve:-J.ll ~ictu:-e 
cut al£o to types of expenditure, such as acricu~t~ral e~er.ditu:e, 
ur.de:- tte Cc~~ity budget. 
3) See Loc~entation on the Coocunity Budget {Azmex II), pp 5 et seqq. 
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c?~c~lation of tr.e co~~on national product is available at t~e 
~tatistics Office of the European Co~7.anity and har~o~izatio~ of t~e 
basis of assess~ent of value-added tax including its passase into 
r.atior.~ tax law is nearing co~pletion. By conparison with taxes en 
val~e, taxes o~ ~uantity are also suitable, probably because t~ey see= 
to need less har~onization as a type of revenue. Such si~~le solutions 
~e s~~erior in their political practicability and tte ti~e ttey t~e to 
i~~le~~r.t 1 ), though the criterion of political practicability also 
includes problems arising from the need to ratify revenue ceas~res. 
F.ere, at le~st in theory, the direct European elections cake it possible 
for ratification to be legitimized direct by the enlarged European 
Parlia~ent instead of by all nine separate parli~ents. At fi:::-st ... ..n~s 
~:ould, of course, need the agreeoent of the separate parlia.:~ents ~d 
thus a lasting renunciation of sovereignty by the ce=be:::- co~ntries. 
1.2 Cl:;.ir.~ on revenue from the point of vie~: of the ~ropean 
Cc:-:-::1r..i t·; 
A ne\·: level in the structure of the public sector has to perforo ta~s 
\\·hich change in the course of tioe with differing degrees of autonor.1y. 
It could therefore be in the interests of the "?ourth Level" alv:a:;s to 
ensure that its finances have the qualities of instr~~ents to ens~:::-e 
their pur~osive use in the long tern2). If the Co~~nity budget ~rows 
at a rate ~'r.ic:: p:::-orluces repercussions in Eu:::-o;e, there \dll be ve:::-:,: 
varied de~ands ~der procedural policy on the fo:::-=ation of Eu:::-opean 
fina."lc es3) • 
1) 7~:s is not to say thct harr.1onization of direct taxes is not an 
:.~::·c~-t=-~-: r=:ee:..s of p:r-o:::)tin~ intcG::-nticr:. 
2) Fer fec.tu:::-es cf tte use of unear~ar}:ed ~ublic finc-_"lces as a."l 
:.:-.:;:.::-..:.:-:c~: ::e·:? !: • ~:.:--::-:-.~~:::a.~: ... , "::::st::-~::-:e!'!t~ de;:- ?:..:-.. c.:::,~,o::. ti.:~" 
(-1---·~- .. -·r:.""•- c.c- ";.'.:""',...l""'".;"", Fo"':.: ·) ~~'"\ ...... ~\....u,... ::"').,. ~ .. .: ..... -,....,..,.;,...~ """'ec'"' _ ..... 
\ •• ...:.. ....... ~...o.. ·-··I..~ - ... -··-• ...... ...,........... -..-CJ 1 ••'--•'"""L C .......... t.: ........ -·"-:....""'-"'-~LJe •• - ... 3.-"" 
(:::,.:::.:::2. c: ~:-.. (; :::2o~:r c: F\:.t2.:.c Fi!"' .. ance;, 3~d cC.:.t:c~, i!"' .. 
c:~=..--·.:.::--~:.:..::::-. ·.-·it: .. :: •. ;r ..c.c: ~-d.·~ H~.l~cr, cC.i-:ed. by:'. !;cu:-.a:-:-:, 
:~~~~~:~ :s-77, ~~ ~72 et ~c~q. 
3) ::c:-- ::~:~:i·_:~:s c.: ~.:..:-: C:i~tr:tt:.~io:l u:1:!er- ~!"c=cC::.:.=.~al ~o:ic:-'" .:~e 
J. :-:::-..::E:::c...~'"\~-::, ··~):.e Stc~er·lcrtei:u:ls zv;isc;:cn E"J:.d. u:1d L~.::dcr:;. ... -
c::.~· :-...::-.'~C~:::"C:-':.;':::::..!: .Ccut.sc:::u::.c11 (7::c ci.strib';.ltiCn Oi' tc.J:e::; l:c:·.:cc:: 
:: .. : :'cicr~:: :..:c·.:c:::-::-..::-.cnt <.:.d t!'.c U!.."l.ccr i::1 the Fcdc:::-ul Republic o: 
(..;<.::-:-::.::), ::..:cdcn-J::.cic=: 1971:, pp 41 et scqq. 
-24- CT YJ.X/2??/7?-Z 
In tte context of the effects on ecc~o~ic develop~ent i~ t~e re~:o~s 
of ~~rope, increasing import~~ce ~ibtt attach to a EUro~e~~ fi~~ce 
:;:olic:r related to sectors and trades as ~rell as to t:!:e resic!:s. 
is tr~e partic~larly if problc~s of this sort increase i~ i~;or:~ce 
\·:itb the ir.tesration :?recess a"l.d ~u~renational action is eco:..c!:icaE:· 
effective 1). If in tte cour::e of its grO\·:th tte Cc::-.::uni ty bud.:;e~ is 
also re~uired to perfor~ a stabilizi~s :fu~ction to be put into effect 
en tte basis of taxation of ce!:and, deficit spending and thus 
pro~essive borrowing autono~y of the Co~~"lities will beco~e necessa.~2 ). 
In resard to future Co~~unity revenues there will also be a de~~~d that 
cc~petiticn should not be affected. If, as is usually the c~e, t~is 
is co~sidered in relation to t:.e taxation of international trade ~~d, 
in the cc~text of "net affectin; outside co::~peti tic!".11 and Ei:::ilar c.:::jects, 
i~ rel~ted to t~(-induced ch~~~es in co~~etitiver.ess in eoods tr~ffic 
bct\:ccr. ::~:-.ber Stntc~ and i·:itr. reference to international factor i!:cc:::e, 
tl:e a.s:r:cct of :·.n.r::oniz<:tticn of taxes in tl"'.e Co:-.:::on l·:arket hn.s to te 
disrerarded. Fro~ the point of view of financing, the r~:::onization 
of the bases of assess::~ent at low levels of autono~y in the Co~7.llnities 
appears ~ore as a tecr:.ical prerequisite for obtaining revenues3). 
If, i::1 tr.e course of the integrntion process, revenue autono=y went 
teyond e:dstir.g taxes end if the Co~:::unities \-:ere to be given jurisdiction 
1) Fe:- t!:e cor...r:ection betv;eer. Con:::uni ty budget ar.d e~plo~"':::e~t :;::clicy 
.see~. ?eeters, "StabEit~tsoricntierte Fir.o.r.zpclitik i.n de:-
G.,-c~"'c-c:-..,f+- SO\rl·e ,,~ ........... u,..-s U"'.J "echr-el1·u ...... .,.o,~t.;•_.." (::'~r...,...,c;..,, 
.... ••. ... ... ..~.- ... 4-u .., •• ....._ .. ,. .... 0 - .L .. lA '' ... .._, ... ....>,!.I .,., -.r~ • ..:.. .t.A..... -""-
pcEc:l •.:i ::--. the object of stability in the Co:::::-:u:.ity, also C".l:-re::1cy 
~d e:::c: . .?!'l:;e-rate policy), !-:nc:Uc~;all Gro-..;.p, Vel I!, :;::;:: L:.O et sec:_q. 
2) ?er- t:-.r: dete:--:-.ir..atic:1 of 'ta.[:~:!3 cf tte Co:-:~ur:i t:: l::.4G.cet t:::c!e::--
;::-ccc:.:.:r~ ~clicy .see ·~·.'.E. Co.tc~ "?:::o.JlZf~C.cr:::.:~~:J~ i!'l 7l:e:~:.e u~C. 
E ::-:...::::-::: :..e :·.ren fUr die e-..;.rc:::!i~c:1e Go:::ci:::sc:w.!"t" (. ::: .::c ::2. ?~dera:.is::: 
i::-. ::.cc:-:' o:.:;d Prc:.cticc: Le.:;.sor:.s for the .E~ro;en..~ Cc::::-:':.;.~:.. t:;), 
:~::.c:=c:..:~~-:: G!"o·Jp, './c,_ r:, !"'~ 2'0!r et sec;.q n...-:C. :;~ :;::7 et ce::::-:, r--::i 
11
.: ~.c ;: .. :·c ~ .s t t!.:1C.ic:enr:.:. zu~ :: e bU ~~c !"' ... tu!"l.G de:- e;e se:.:.: t · ..... :..:-- t.sc~.:!.:t:..:.c ~.t;!l 
-~ ... .; ~·-'··~- ~->- ... -.r-·t~c"tc"" 1°rt'?/..,r7." (BO'"''"c.' c-f' :.~v-c'"t"" .:-o ... 4 '-e 
....... ~ ....... .- ........................... , '-'--· .... ._:-:....,""'- l...oo. ....... !. / -- ~· ~ ......... _ ..... ..,.,.;..) .......... .. 
... .::::c.~:~~.:::: u: c,.Te~c.:l Lco~ .. c:-:.ic ~enC.~, ll1"..r:.UU: Rc~ort 
.:.:::-::.c:-. !:o 22 et s0~q. 
1972/?3)' 
3) :?::r ~:::.: relatic::.stip ~ct·.:een the objecti·:es of te.;.: t::::::cr:.i.::::.::on 3.!:d 
::: ::..::.-.::.::ci:-.; the Cc::-.:::uni ty Budt;et see al.so ;... Prest, ?isd.l !.ss-..:.es, 
G. :.c::::on (cd), :Scc:1o:::ic and r:o::1etary Unio::. in ~ope, ~::::.c:: 19?4, 
- ~c et s~q. 
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eve~ the setti~; of tax rates and bases of assess=.ent o~ even a ri~~t to 
i:::::;oEe a ne\·! tax (rie;ht of tax deter~in~tion), t~e general re~:.:i~e:::e~ts 
ur.C.e:- the "principle of avoid:.~t; uneesired detrir.:e~t to co::~etitio~ as a 
resu~t of ta"<aticn11 could be considered1). The co::;petition a:"b=e~t 
t~e:-efore £ains i~portance in the case of a surcharge ~~or ea:-:::arked 
divided Eyste:-::. 
J.. ::;oi::t :.~ cispute is the i:-:portance of •::hetl:.er a type of reve::ue is 
pe~ceivec (its "perceptibility11 ) as en ele:::ent pro:::otir.g intesration 
er.d ns a c~itcrion for assessinG a European systeo of revenue. 
"Fe~~cived involve:::ent of tl:.e tax:?o.ye~" could be actieved 'ty suitably 
pla."lr.ed ta:< su~ple~:;ents, say as a disclosed chart;e in the case of indi.~ect 
t~(es or az a.~ ~:.ounced su::;ple:-:ent on ir.co~e tax. Perce~tibility has 
c.:.saeYD...'1t::l.~es i:f it l:as an adverse effect on a'v:areneEs of :Europe a::d. if 
an i::-::)l:..ed or actual ear~arking of Cc::-~-::u~i ty taxes exacerbates disco~ tent 
\·:i t!-1 6Cve~:r.:::e::t. Pe~ceptibili ty could nevertteless, on the grcu::1ds 
t;iYe:::l ir. tte liter3tu~e2 ), be regareed as a secondary factor in t::e revenue 
it::; i:::port.:u:.ce increasine - as in the co:::petiticn 
arsur..c:::t - \d t:'l crowing revenue autonor.:y of the Cor..r.:uni ties. 
1) See F. ::eu:::2.r~:, ''Grund~~tze ge~echter und ~;-:c::1o:::isch rationa:::.er Steuer-
pvl: til:" (:?r:nc:!.ples of fair a.~d econo~icnll:: rationnl t~.: po::'..icy), 
loc cit, pp 266-232 and tl:e literature referred to t~ere, also fo~ 
assess:::ent of the effects of sover~~ent activity on co:::~etit:.ve::1ess, 
I. :·:et::e, ".Steuerh2.rr.:onisierur.G in einer \-ii~tschaftsger.:einsc!-.aft 11 
(T2.X har::-.c!'lization in an econor.1ic co::-.munity), Hn..-::burg 1969, :::.? 3'1 et seqq. 
2) .See F. !leu:::ark, "Grur.ds!:!.tze gerechter und tn~ono:-:;iGct rationa:er S7.euer-
po2.itik" (Frincip2.es of fair and economically rational tax policy), 
loc cit, pp 37 et seqq. 
3) I: ~ercc~tibility is to be used on nn instru:::cnt of interratic~, we 
c::.::.d b::::--1:; t!:c e::}:cric~ce of t!:c fiscnl p~:;c:-.o::..o::ists. :a \·:o:.::!.e 'ce 
t!:e:r ~et to ceve::.op types of rcve:-:ue \··hich .s;10\oJ iC.ent: tj· c:..::C. crentc 
:-_r. ::: :2re~0~::; cf E:.;~cre ~d. soli C.~::': ty =:!CTC["S the !"rc::ti.cr::. :::1tic~.:ll 
~,r~:.::"t:i.c~c i~ tnx i:one~t:t ~j"Je ~lE:o teen E"t:;.died b~,. fi::c~l :-;~yc:~:>:c~ists; 
c .. ~ !"'2-~G.:: t!:e develop:-:cnt of :S:.:.ropec:..,_ revenue, for exn..--:-:ple, t;:e 
cc:-_:::-c:c: .. c-!'lce cf sue:. vcu-ic.tio::::: is th~t Hl:ere r~tes of tn:·: r.::::i :.:1ses of 
n.::·::cs::::;:;::t are !:arr:".onized, the yie2..d f~o:-1 tte r.~tic:-:al :;:~ocu:t "-'ill 
~i~~c~ ir. re2.etio!1 to t!:e tax ho!'lcsty of t!:e diffc~ent r..:lt:c:::~. ~e 
\:i:.:. :-_et co!'l~icer \··hct::-.e~ t!:is ::i tc;.ntion s~c;;:d be nccc:;tcd ~ . .s a 
re.:::ic:::,.l ct::rnctcri::tic or y:tether o re::-.edy z!:culd 'te scuc!:t in the 
i:::tc~est.s of ~ustice ar.d i:::tebration. In tte c~se of a Zu~c~c~~ 
reve::::.:e sy::te::: this sit;;.o.tion could be avoiccd ty bazi:::.:; assec;s-::: ::: 
c:--. n:J.tion:::.~ ?rcd:.:c~ .st&-::.s~ic::. Sec K.-:r. :~::.=:::c~,e~, l~. ::.:.c::.:c::ci.C:t, 
"?:.r~~z~:;yct.olocic" (jo'izc~l 1--!::yc!"'.o:!.c::-J), ;::l:" .. .:i:.::.c:: dcr ?:.~z:.·.:i0~e!:=:>C~A:.!"t 
(;.:~'1t.:o.2. of the T::eory of i-'ublic Fino.r.ce) ;·rd ee:. tic::, in co:2.<:bo~ntio::: 
l':ith ll. Andel and H. Huller published by F. ;{eu.-::nrk, loc cit, :;;p 566 et 
seqq, and the literature referred to there. 
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2. Ir.tcGratic~-orie~ted deter~i~nr.ts of fi~~~cir.s 
2.1 Integration objective ar.d financing the Co~7.Unity 
t-..:dr-et 
'l'te i::?ortance of the reve:r.'..le ~yste:: for i~tesration ea.~ be a:-.D.ly.::ed 
o~ the one r.a~d by lookinG into t~e c~uces of tnc st~~dstill in 
intesrD.tion of recent yeD.rs a.~d on the other by isolatir.s t~e condi~ior.s 
fc:- a ?Oli tical unic~ in accorda~ce v;i th diffe:-cr.t theories cf 
intesration. The lirJ: with the revenue systen is found if t~e 
ca'..lses of the breakdo\~ in integration cc~ be re~oved ty ce:-tD.in 
revenue arrar.ger.ents or if the stages leading to an eccno~ic and 
politica: '..lnion can be passed ~ore rapidly by ~eans of suitable 
financin~1 ). At the sa~e ti~e it is reccsnized that fina.•cing 
instr~;.ents to p:-o~ote intecration can make on:y a s::all cor.trib~tion 
tm:crds '..mi tinz Europe. Very pro'tably the Eu:-o~ean tD.sks or 
eA?endi~~re ?lay a more i~po:-tant part in the long ~n than reve:r.'..le, 
not to ~ention the poli ticcl will of the r:e::1be:- States ar:d the r.:=--~::· 
sr.'.all advances tov:ards i~tet;rD.tion \·:hich are 'teinc acco::J:;;lis:-.ed by 
'rtay of non-budget-effective changes in the integre.tion st:--.1cture. 
J..s, hO\:eve:-, situations can be i~agi:r.ed in Hhic:-. revenue rcL,v.laticn:; 
ea~ have adverse effects on integration and, moreover, an analysis of 
fir.anc:ng a "Fourth Level11 includes the effects of this on the 
jurisdictional levels of the ::Jer.'.ber countries, revenue is by no 
r.:eans a factor to be disrecarded in the context of integration. 
1) T~e i;~ort~ce of fi:r.cr.cinc the Cor.~unities for integ:-ation, end 
t::i.s cc...~ vc:.:~· :n tl::.e c:::urse of ti:::e, is also deterr..i!led 'ty t!-.e 
cesired or &t~~incd de~~ee of intcc:-~tion. Or. the bnsic 
o;:;:c~t:..:::itie:s :o:- deve::.c:;:;.ent of tl::.e Co::-_-;;ur:ity see E. v.:i. G~cete::, 
"D:.e Z;;.:-c-:t!isc:-.e Gc::-.eir.sc!-.n.ft z·,.:ischen F!;C.eration u::C. ::::-tic::::.:.st~c':." 
Cz::c :::::;;.rc::c~ Cc::-.r.:u::ity bet\:cer. fcdcrn.tion one natic::), v.d. G~oc'::::e~, 
7·-n-···· ,..,. · · (cd\ J·~ . .,.,d'~-·•c,., ~ur "'".,..0"" 11 .;.,.cJ..c ••.;.,.. ... _c .... ..,-- ... ("--.. ~' 
_._...__._a, _.,""::l.('!:::!.!"" . .: J 1 •'--~.&. a..tl.A. •• • .....,.....,.., :,:'{.;...1.-.J •• ~.-..,. ""._, ,. • ...._."" •·--·---. 
:c~ tl::.e ::1;-:'0?e<:...~ ecor.ony), r:o 1.51, Cctober 1977, :::? 1 et sec.::. 
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~· f \. d '11 . . t ~. 1 ) . t . ..1. ~~. As reGards ~~e causes o t •• e stan st1 1n 1n ecra~1cn , 1 ls ~: •• 1c~lt 
to fi::ld a lin!< ·.·:it!: t!:e develc:pr.1ent of t:,.e revenue systc:::. 
tl:e cat:.se of lack of S'..Iccess of integration intentions is "ceen i::1. t!:e 
inadeq_uate conce:_::lt of \·:hat c.n econor:-.ic a.'"ld r.:onetary union is a.!:d ·.:!:OJ.t 
ccr.di tions r:ust be fulfilled for it to be created a.'"ld to f'J.!lcticr.112 ), 
links v;i th the revenue system can be found in conjunction Hi th t!:e 
pre~e~~isites and deter~inants of fu~t!:er econo=.ic intesratio::1.. ':'here 
is, !".o.,.;ever, no agree::1ent on tr.e \·:eightint; of the criteria, as they 
ce~e::1.d on the basic integration theories and the degree of integTation 
de!:ire~. It is therefore conceivable that specific financing syste~~ 
could be developed for the different integration theories and for the 
decree of integration desired. 
Fro::: the relatior.ship beb1een the revenue syste::: a.'"ld integration l.et t:.s 
now pick out interregional redistribution as one of the prerequisites 
for an eccnc:':lic and r.1onetary union. Politically, redistribution c~ 
be 3ustified cbove all by ~eference to recicnal differences in living 
standards3) and to the Treaty of Ror.:e (P~eamble and Article 2 of the 
Treaty of Ro::-.e). Econo:::ically, it can te considered in relation to 
balar.ce of pay:::er.t proble:::s \..rhich may lead to intervention under 
resionnl policy if chances in rates of exchance fail as a cc~~ective. 
11
'.!':-.ere the~e are great structural differences ••• pre:::ature fixi::g of 
rates of exc!".ance \·!i thin the Cor..r.:unity would exacerbate existinG tensions 
a~d reduce t!:e chances of ~tual convergence of the econo=.ies lir~~ed in 
1) See ·.:. Harbrech t, 11 Die Eu~o~~ische Gcr:-.einccl".aft" ( '::.:-.c Bt:.~o~ea.~ 
Co::::::ur.it:·), Stutt;:art, Ne~J: Yor:: 1978, pp 1'?0 et zer:-::• 
2) ~S>::o~t cf t!".e Study Grcu:;: 1 '''.·.'irtscho.fts- t:.r.d '..'!i:':u::.:;::::.:..."::.cn ~~: :::c" 
( -cc~o-.;c -~rl 1'onc .. - .... v r~,..l·on) •·ar~ol~n Ber;c·~· "::l.,..... • .,.-c,s 1°"':::: - 3 L. ........ c;..,.._ ....... ..:-.., u... ' ... .; ... - ~ ..... , ~--~""- , ,.,., ~ • 
3) ?o~ c ctc~~~tic~l picture of ~he dis~~itics in ~~c~~c a::c livi~~ 
E~:.::'i::.:d::;, E~e ::acJo~;:;all Grot:.p, Vol I, p 29, r;.:!.~c ::. ?rc::.z.:::e~·er, 
:=. • .:e::.Cel' 11 libcrstaatlic~er Fi::.:l:';.ZC:~~clcich ~""ld O~:'O~:l:.~c:.e 
Ir.tc,:~Pticn" (.Su:pr:mo:ticnal fir::cn.l ad~t:str.e:1t a~d :::::~r::-:eo.:: 
.; .. -.~--·--.;c...,) 1 cc c.;• '--c·· 2 .... 2--;:. ,., ... ~c,...~ ..,-,..o -.·-'" 4 o,.. 
- ...... ~~· ~- .. ::. ""• -· ' - ..&. ... ' r ... u ... ""· , :..J~ )./ \,;;"' iJ ...... \..:, """-- _ ...... tw_.... .... 
p~ 44 e~ EC~~; for a j~sti:ic~tic~ of ir.:er-st~t~ reCi~tri:~~~or. 
r::cc a:.:::c C. :verlir.;, 11.t.uscleich de:r 11tirt.:::c!:a!'-:lic::c=: und .sc::::.<L.cn 
l::-.:e~::c:-.iede :i.n dcr EG11 (;.djust:i.n.-; ecor.c~::.c cr.d social di!':~~e=::es 
i:1 t!:e Ei.:.~c-:e:m Cor:.-::unity), Die Bank (T':.e Bar~), No 12, 1973, 
"""" c::c7 e ... .,.-ecc .:-~ /-' " ..... . .• 
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tte Co;.~~nity u~less ~assi¥e fina~cial transfers ~;e~e ~ade to a~~~ox:7.ate 
1) 
s't:::-1.:ct"..::-al b~.ses of the eco::::;.:ies to one x:ot!'.er" 
·.·:!'let::e~ this finc::.ncial safe.:;t:<'-.rdi:::; of an econo:-:1ic ru:d :::or.ct~r u::ic~ 
is :fc:.:.:::.ci to 'te adequate in tl:eory z...~d on \orhether it would be 
politically feasible fro~ the poir.t of view of the flow of :fi~~ce 
reqaired, integration could be accelerated or the degree of inte~aticn 
attai~ed could be consolidated2). 
Tl:e pO\•er to redistribute wealth ar.o~g the regio::s resting wit:-. a ~.::ve:::.:.:.e 
s:/~'tc:-1 er v:i th the overall finn..~cing syste~ havir-s influence beyond the 
Cc:-.. ::nmi ty budget there·fore has a central importar..ce for intecrat:.on, 
and fi:.~~cing the Co~~r.ity has an objective related to regional polic~) 
\!hicl': will increase \·rhen we have a Europe of Twelve. 
1) ',!. v. Vrff, 11 Zur :rJ.rJ.:tion des G~er.znus.;leichs bei \·iechselku~.s!L~der..:.r-ben 
i:: S~·ste::: der :::~·.'G-;.srarr.:nr}~tordr.ur.cen11 (The fur.cticn of co:.:.::tervaili:lg 
i~~o~t duties in chances of exchanse rc::.tes in the syste~ of ~ 
a.:;~ic-:.:.::!.. tural I:'!arket rec..:.lations)' ..:.c;rarvrirt::chaft (h.gricul t:u-al 
econor:1y), Vol 23, !lo 5, 1974, p 169. 
2) 1: is open to discussion \':r.ether redistribution ir. favct:.r of poorer 
countries is sufficient for the policy of deflatio:::. c::.r.d c~~·,:t:-.. so 
o:te:::. desi~ed in t::ese co-....ntrie.s in the cor.text C·f ti:c b~sic 
intecration theo:-:: to be :-:o.de effective or sur:;ported in t!:e lo.:1:; :er:::. 
3) I!:. t:-.e gr.:;.::u3.ted pla.'"l of the ' . ."erner Report fir..ar..ci:::s the Co:7'_-::t;.ni ties 
is o: ~rncticc.l.::!..y !:.C i:::pcrtance and even in Tir.de~~ans' co:::ce:::t of 
s:~~e-by-st~;e intesration no great i~port~.ce attcc!:es to f~nar..ces 
fc~ ~~e ;~r?~ses o: inte0ratic~. A dif:ere~t ~tt::ude :s ~d:,~ed 
in t:-.e ; :.:r jolin Re~crt in ·.·:hie!: Eii.:.rcpee.n re[:io::al policy :-.as a s:;:ecial 
~csi ":io:-.; tr.e "inte:;rnticn :pr.ilosor;!-:y" stded t:!-.ere has al~ee.:::.· led 
to a de~~d for prc~ressive revenue for t!:e Co~~~nities ~c. :::~tic:.:.:~ly 
to a ;-ropocal for the t~x3tion of areas of inc~~trial cor.ccntration. 
:-:.-.'2'r:; :-.::os c.lso 'ce£>n ~ dc::-c..""Jd fo~ a Cc:-.":":'.mi t~, fur.d :c~ t:.:-.r::-:-:::.c:·:-.r:-nt 
i:r . .:::;-J.r<:u:ce \·:!".~ch, i: sui t~.bly pla.'"lr.eC., cot:ld also le~d :o ~ecii ::::r:.. 'tt:. ticn 
~y re::::~!':!:>. For t~e ::~cDouc:...ll Group n E~rc:-:c~ re;i.c:--.~: :--o~:c:: 
::-·: ~ 0:-.c.:: t!:e 'ea si .s of t~e part to be :rlayc·d ty ;::..: ':: l:. = fi:: ::.::.::: c ir. 
~~:rc~·~c-""1 i!:ter;ratic!: \·J:::c::. t!"".ey c.r.alyEe ar.d ~e::uire. ~=e ~e'"':c~'t 
:~ :>c Cct:~cil a~C -t:~c Co:::'"".:i..ssion on tr.e s~:-:e-~y-t:t~:c ::--.. t:--c-:.:;.ct:.o~ 
c: ::c::::::.c~:ic CJ.nd l·~o::c:a.r:.· t:nion in t::e Co::::-::t:.ni t~· (" . ."er:::er Rc;.o~:), 
::-_::::e:s ~;~o, CZ?ccic.lly '? 3 et seqq c.r:C. 13 et cc~~: ''::::..:.~c::e~l!'l 
~~:c~··, ~c~ort 'ty L. ~i~de;.c::.r..~ to t::c E:.:.rc~ea:::. Cou~cil (~:.e ~::::ie~a::s 
~c~c~t), ~ulletin of t!:e ~t:ropean Co~~r.ities, Sup~le:::ent 1/~6, 
e.s~eci:1l:y pp 21 et sec:,q ar..d 27; Eo.r~olin Report, 2-oc cit, ~p 27 
e: cec a.·d e~pccially pp 32 et seqq; 1-:acDougall Gro~p, '/ol ~, 
c.s~ccial:y ?P 12 ~~d 25 et seqq. 
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2.2 3edi~'tri't::.tion between Eerr.ber States by r.:eans cf a Co::-.:::-..u:.ity 
rev.:nue sYste~ 
2.2.1 Distrit~~ing t~e financial burden; the de~and !or 
redistrituticn 
2.2.1.1 Orientation by capacity to pay: concept and e~;irical 
1:i.ct~re 
7r.e de~and for a progressive revenue syster.: takes a central place in t~e 
discussion of the distribution of the financial burdens in the s~tere of 
intee;raticn. In the context of its proposals for the future !i~~cing 
of the Co::::::-.;::li ty budget the Co~~-::ission speaks o: "avoiding a widening of 
econo:::ic differences", of "reducing econooic differences" and de::e:.ds 
that "in principle any regressive factor (should be avoided"1 ). 
In principle e~uivalence and capacity to pay should be invoked in t~e 
distribution of the financial burden, exactly as on the national plane. 
\v'e r.:ust as~.l:::e, however, that asGessr:Jen t of the fin~cial burden ty t!":e 
ecuivaler.ce ~rinci~le is elir.:inated because a prescribed financial need 
. . 2) 
has to be covered • 
or na:io~al perfor~ance 
This raises the question of indicators of regional 
or ability to pay3). 
1) Finar.cing the Co~~unity Budbet - Future r.:ethod, Bulletin of the 
Euro~ean Co~~unities, Supple~ent 8/78, pp 20 and 8. 
2) T.~ere are in any case lir.:its to the use of the equiva~ence principle 
as reE~ds the present tasf.s of the Co::-~unity, as in the case of 
s:;:ecifica:ly public seeds and tra11sfer expenses, a."'ld in relat:..cn to 
t!:.e distribution of i:;.co:::e between regions it has obvious s!-.crtco::ings. 
See, tov:ever, Section 2.2.2 on net tra."'lsfer accot4nts a."'ld t!:e ".:J:..ste 
reto:.:.r~ 1 • Co:;.siderc.tio::s of eq-:1i valence are certair.ly i:::porta."'lt i!". 
assessin; the 11 juste retour" or the cor.:pati'l::ili ty of pay:.:er.ts 0::1 the 
c:2 ::-.c.r.d <;..r.d return flcv:s of fu::ds or benefits on the other fro::1 the 
pcin: o! viev of t~e :.:e~ber countries. 
3) ?~0 ~~estion of the ef!ect of redistrituticn a~onG St~tes vi~ Co~:.:unity 
fi~~ncin: en the distritt4tion of r.nticnal incor.:c is incc~e~~(nt o: t~e 
'::.u:"::::c:: c-~ccordin;:: tc re_sionnl cc.r:nci ty. '::"::~se eff~ct~ ari..::e fro:-1 the 
::..:::::::.. -:::::1cc of r-·ay;.;ents :-:ade by t::c i· ~:::ter Stc.tes to t!-.e Co:-:~:.::-:: ty 
t:..::-:e:t. So lor.:; 8S a civen tax yie:d is not C.iv:.ded ~d ::l...lr::-2<::. 
t:::-:0.:::; ss s:1ch ere not levied, :fi::.:;.ncinc is effected f:-cr:: t!-.e :e::er:ll 
rc;:c:::.:.e.s, recardless of .... r.nt t:-.e tF,x is called, and the effects of the 
c.:..:otri~ut:c:: in tl-.e i.ndividual r.e~ter country are in lir..e \•::.t:: t!-.:::se 
of :.~s tota: f~r.ds. As rec?rds personnl distri'l::utior. see also G. 
Jer.ton, "Re!lectio:-.s on Fiscal Federalis::n in the EZC 11 , JO\.:.r::al of 
Co:::::cn ::ar~:et Ztudies, Vol 16, ~;o 4, 1978, pp 29C et se~. 
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In the concept of national taxation on the basis of capacity ~~~y 
ind~cato~s of capacity are discussed as ~ossib:e bases of assess~ent 
and in the sa'lie WD.Y various f:~andards can te used in the finar.cir.; of 
the Co::-.:::uni ty. These includes, for example, the gross or net natic~al 
product at market prices, national inco~e, disposable inco~e or p~:v~~e 
cor.s~~ption ~~d other values such as national wealth, foreign cu~rency 
reserves, goverrient interests, the inter.sity of competition, individual 
or overall revenue-raising power or the production potential1 ). Tr..e~e 
~isht ~ell also be a culti-di~ensional ir.dicator bringL~g in a nur.ber of 
social indicators. 
'1':-.e ar.a:cgy with taxation according to capacity at national level breaks 
do\-m beca-:;.se individual capacity is oriented to the possibilities of 
sa::.~:ying ::::eeds 11:hich are to be lir.:i ted by ta.''<ation. This utility-oriented 
a~:;:roac!: \·li:!.l not be pursued here; ~oreover, let us assu:::e that the 
r.icro-indicators of individual capacity are reflected in the :::acre-values 
of recior.~l ca~acity. It cou:!.d also be argued against the a~a:!.c~ that 
if :he Cor.:r.:unity is financed only in the context of a divided syste:;: 
there is a separate taxation syster.:, whereas, for exa:;:ple, in the context 
of an allocation system only one assessment basis or apportio~~er.t for:;:ula 
is sou;tt. \·,'hile this distinction only beco:::es i:;:pcrta'"t when a fiscal 
I 
adjust~ent system has to be established, we shall discuss in what follows 
the ceasurecent of the capacity of the member countries or their power to 
contribute. 
In the "~uota concept" the quotas of the r:-:e::ber countries in fir.ar.c:n; the 
Co;.=.unity budget can be calculated and compared with the relative shares 
of the r.:e:::ber countries in the total product of the Co~=.ur.ity o~ other 
indicators of capacity. 
1) ~ec :.._.:::o R. ::=ef:c~ove::::, "Ir.tcrnationnle Finar.zordn-:;.nt;" (I:ltcr:::J.:icnal 
i'ir.<:..::cial :::a11c:r:e::~ent), H. Grl:l:1cr, A. Sc!:Uller (ec), "Inter:1:1ticna:e 
·.:.:.:-t::c::<:.:tsc::-cnung" (International eccr.o:::ic :::a..~ae;e:-:c:::: t), lee c it, 
:;::;: 1;:.:.. ~t .seqq and R. Sza\·rlov:.ski, ''Finanzen ur.d Fir.anzrec!:t :=er 
i::te:-:::~tior..:J.lcn zwi.schenstaatlichcn Organisationen (IZC)" (::'inc...~.ces 
&!:C. i'ir.ancial law of the internntior:al inter-state o~c::.i::-:::io::s) 
(IZC), {:. Gerloff and F. Neur.:ark (ed), "F.andbuch der ?inanzw:sse::sc!:-::!'t" 
(Lw:t:.cl of the theory of public fir:ar..ce), Vo: IV, 2nd edi ~ion, lee cit, 
pp 311 et seqq. 
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In the case o! a tax on added vnlue, energy consu~ption, to~~cco, alco:.ol, 
etc, t~e bases of assess~ent can be ex~ined as to whether they c~ :e 
correlated on the s~e lines as the selected indicator of capacity. If 
t~at is not so and taxation based on capacity is required, corrective 
r::ech~is::is ¥/ill be needed to ensure proportional taxation so as to ;revent 
over or under-pa~ents. In r::aking these cor::parisons attention ~~st te 
paid to the ti~ing of the bases of assess~ent and the capacity indicators. 
?or exailple, if nll countries <1re required to pay 1~~ of a har::;or.ized 
assess~ent 't:hich is not identical with the gross national product as a 
ca:r:aci ty indicator and if its value fluctuates differently bet ... :een one 
cour.try a11d a:1cther, there will be regional effects of distribution 't:hich 
r::ay i~~~ibit further integration. In the case of the value-added tax 
scl:e!:e, if tl:e asses.s:-::ent based on the national product declines in one 
country 't:hile by co:::parison it increases in another, tax would not be 
pro~ortior.al. ~~is developr::ent is possitle in the case of all taxes ~~d 
cor.tri t"..ltio!'ls 'Y:here the basis of assessr.:ent is not tl:e sar.1e as t~e capacity 
ir.dicator. Fror:: this point of view it \.,rould therefore see::~ appropriate to 
orier.t fin~~cin~ to the gross national product (see C). 
If t~e gross national product is recognized as an indicator of ca~acity the 
fin~~cir.g quotas of t~e countries in the total budget of the Co~~nity1 ) 
a!'l~or in certain tJ~es of revenue c~~ be cor::pared with their shares in the 
1) See FeC.eral }:ir.istry of Finance docur::entation 6/77, 6/78 and 4/T:, also 
Fir.nncial Re:;:;ort 1978, Eonn 1977, p 53, Finnncial Report 197':, Ec~..r. 197.3, 
I 
p 4? c..."d Deutscl:e Eundesbnnk, "Die 't:achsende Eedeutung der :S:.:.rc:;::!!isc!':en 
Ger::ei::sc:haften fUr die t:lffentlichen Haushnlte der Bundesre;u':.Et:" (':'!-.e 
gro\·:ing irnportar.ce of the European Cor::r::uni ties for the public au t::-~ori ties 
of t~e Federal Republic), r:or.t!':ly Reports of the Deutsc~e E~!'l~es~ank, 
January 1977, pp 15 et seqq. The cc:::~osi tion of the Ger;..a:: ::.n:;;r.cin.; 
quota can be seen from the table taken fror.1 the Fina.~cial Re;:o=-t ·.978, p 5:., 
'1973 1974 1976 ! 19771 J ~:-.. :::--2.:-:..se ,.:~-- ,. ...., __ i 
' / ,. : . ~ 
1!:::. 
I 
a.:::.:ol~te: 
..... ,_,_ ..... __ 
......... : ·-
PCj'.,;.S":I:'.ent.)1 
~.~ ...... 
........... "" .. ' 
1) i"-cl overl&?-Ferioc ite~ 1/77. 
{Joir origina::J 
I 
,. .... 7. • :> • I I..,.., • ..... ., ,.,; , 
2) Finar.ce volu=e after ruling of 21 April 1970 (excl other revenues). 
3) 1 ua = Dl~ 3.66 
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"grczs national ?roduct" of the Cc~r.unity to fi::d cut ~.;het!'".er t!:e ::e:::'ter 
co~ntries are cc~trib~ting to the fin~~ces in prc?o::-t~on to t~ei::-
ecc::o:::ic perfor::a.nce or proc~ction ca:;:;acity. 
fc::- 1973 ~~d the hypot~etical contricutic~s in the context of the 
value-added tax sche~e. It is evident that in 1978, in the case cf the 
ove!"all fim:.ncing ~uotas, "rich" co\1ntries like France and the Federal 
Rc;:::.:.'tli:: of Ger:::ar.y, paid less than \'o'0\1ld have corresponded to a tax 
proportional to G!~. "Poor" co~.tries, like Italy, Irelar.d ar.d the 
United Kinr,do~, on the other hand, paid more than was proportional to 
the nat~onal product. 
This approach can be applied to the various types of revenue (custc:::s 
d~ties, price-adjust::ent levy and sugar duty, financial contri't~ticns) 
and in future to value-added tax and, as will be seen, leads to different 
verdicts on the i::ple~entaticn of financing on the princi:;:;le of capacity. 
If a policy of redistribution was to be adopted on the basis of ttese 
re~~lts, ~ore fin~~ce would, ether thinr,s being equal, have to be ~rcvided 
fro~ the rich countries, and Co~:.unity custocs revenue a~d the price-
adjustr:ent levy would be virtually useless for the purpose of redistrib':J.tion 
ar.;::r.g States. Efficacy for redistribution policy could only be e~ed 
in the case of financial contributions and value-added taxes ar.d, above 
all, in relation to new Co~nity revenues. 
The results of quota calculations are open to arzu:::ent. In the~e ar.a:yzes 
of the flo\o: of pay:-;ents, custc:::.s duties ar:.d agric'..ll t1.:ra: ;::rice-:.d~1.:st::-.ent 
levies d'..le to the Cor.-.r.'..lni ty bud~et are charged to tr.e Ee:::ber State ·.;hie!: 
receives the~ ~d has to p~ss the::: on. The yield f::-om C'..lstc;..s C.uties in 
tl:e Cc·-.:-:.:.ni ty countries therefore fluctuates because of geo~r~:;::-.:.cal 
T::en tl1ere is the fllrtter-reacb.ir.b objec::c!: t:-.. :;.t \-.'ith 
ti:.e ceve:c::~:.er:t of t!:.e "o·.·r~1-resourccs" syste::: revenues accruir.s to ~te 
C:~~~r::.::· ~tc~ld be c:::ittcd fro~ the calculation of fin~~cins q~c~as. 
1) Fe~ cx~~:c, a dcc~:ers' .s~rike in tl:e United Kir:gdo::: le~ds ~o.~o!"e C.~ty 
hi!".: :;:e.id. ::.:1 Ge~:::x:y and the Net::e~lar:ds. T'.::e two last-r.a:::e:!. 
cc~r:~~ies ~tcre:crc :::crease their cc:J.tributicn to Co~~ity fi:J.anci~, 
,..:;.ere.;;.s tte lini ted Ki::;;dc:: cont~ibution drop-s. 
_""" __ ... 
'l'hc finnt)cinc quat~~> of the countries, in total and by types of revenue 
:i 11 ·1 "n\Ll J 
-. 
F i n a n c i n g q u 0 t n s 
''1"'1) lJopul<l tion2 ) Total3) Customn4) Ac;ricultural Own .F'inMcinl t-) ~J )l ( 1<f!'l) duties price-ndjuctment recources contribution:-J.:; 
levies nnd 4) dutieG sucnr 
•' /~ "' ,I> % % % % % 
( 1) (2) ( 3) (I~) (5) (6) {7) 
Pc lr,i u r.J 
Gcr::ilJjy 
Frnncc 
Italy 
Luxer-.bourr; LV 0 i r o r i g i n a]} 
Netherlands 
Denr:-,<:rk 
Ireland 
United Kinr,dom 
C o;:,;r,un i ty 
n) VAT ~chene not yet in force in 1978. 
(7) . (1) Finnncing . 
quotas6) VA'l' 
~ 
(8) (9) 
1) Co~:niccion of the Europoun Cor:1munitiee, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affuirs, Europecm Economy, 
Annuul .J::cono:.1ic Hq.ort 1~~'/!-1)'/'), JJove::-:ber 1r)78, tlo 1, p 87 (GVP nt current prices and exchunGe rate~.). 
2) J:;uro0tatictict;, d<•ta on cyclicnl economic nnalysic, .SOEC, January 19'/9, p 13. 
3) Gfficinl Jrmrnal of tl:c Euror;c<m Cor:;muni tic[;, L3G, Vol 21, 6 February 1~)'/8, p 40. 
4) 1 bi cl. 
5) Offir:it·.J J<,urn;ol of the Europenn Communitien, L121, Vol 21, 8 t·lny 1978, p 8. 
G) (JfficJ< l ,Jut<rii:Jl of the Ll!rOJC<·n Conrnunitiec>, 136, Vol 21, 6 February 1(Y/8, p l+(). 
I 
I 
I 
I 
' \.11 ~ 
I 
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Custo:::s duties, price-adjustr.:ent levies and suga= d;.<ties ·.·:c'.,.;.:..c. t::e~ be 
Eu~ope~ revenues ~~d although they would be ~aid in the ~ember countries, 
they would not, for that reason, enter into the calcul3ticn of the 
national fin~~cing quotas. If this vievJ is adcr-ted, the que:::tic::1 ar:.s~s 
as to \-:hich revenues can reason.s.bly be co::1.side~ed for t!-.is pu~:?cse. 
quotas are calculated without the Co~~nity's O\in resources, only t~e 
fin~cial contributions can be considered. ~e result for 1973 can be 
see!l from Table 1. \·Ji th the exception of Italy and the LPz<, all tr.e 
co~~tries paid less than was proportional to their quotas as calculated 
on the basis of national product 1). If vre consider the corres?onciing 
quotas fer 1978 under the contribution and the value-ndded tax ~ste~s, 
Italy cc~es off better and France worse under the value-added tax S)•steo 
th~~ under the financial contribution system generally applic~tle up to 
and including 1973. Italy will be encouraged to ada~t national legislation 
as quickly as possible to the harmonized basis of assess~ent so as to hasten 
the change to the value-added tax systeo. As against this, howeve~, the 
figures relating to value-added tax are very rough estir.:ates. 
Such quota calculations lose ir.:portance when the change to the 0~~-reso~ces 
syster.J is complete and value-added tax replaces t:-_e financial contributions2). 
Afte~ all, the revenue-raising jurisdiction in the r.:atter of o~~ ~csources 
lies ~holly or partially with the Cor.:r.:unity; for the }ier.:ber States they 
are o:-.ly "self-balancing i te:-:-.s" and in tr.e case of price-acijust::-.ent levies 
and the s~5ar duty they are reco~pensed for collection and aci=.inist~ation. 
These objections ce~tainly do not ir.:ply that it is useless f~o~ the econo~ic 
point of vie\·1 to ask which country transfers the funds. If deter~inaticn 
of the rezic::1al incidence of Co~~unity revenue is of interest :.n cc~~ecticn 
~ith reci~~rib~tion, the i~cide~ce of the oblisatio~ to pay, ie the 
1) ;._ c:!.::-c::-cr.t :;;ict:.:.re presents i t.self i!' t::e relcvo.nt s:-.:-:cs c: Cc--::--·..:ni ty 
G~;- c:c cx~res::cd r.ot only in ?JA b~t in ter:--s of purc!-. .:::.si::;: :;:o\·:er. 
Cc-:.::::.::::.~::c:-.3 t;::.ve stc·,.rn thnt t!'le st:;.res calculated in purc::.a~i:-._=:: :;:~· .. ;er 
~:..:--:. -:ic.:: ere: le\ ·e:r for E':-.::mce nnd t!:e Fcdcrnl ?.e-;:ut-lic ~d !"'~:..~:.c~ : ... c.!" 
t~.:: ::::i:ed Ki:::dc:!l and Italy. See Eurostat, r~ational ~cccu~.-:s :s.s.:., 
::.:c-~;T, sc::::;c, loo cit 1973, :;::~ V!II et se~q and ~~ 32 et .seq of th::..s 
:;::~:;:er, ~~so :3t:e 2 ar.d Table 4 of the Arillex. 
2) ;.::..s:: ::;. ::.:::.::.c:..c, "Ln r'c:::ovaticn des institutions fin3...~cie~es des cc::::.:-..t:::1utes 
--- ... --~-=-~--~ c.·,---"s 1r'71""" c,...,..~e re"e\·'al of the .f'l·..,,,.,c.;al ~-st~ ...... ~c-s c~ c ... _ ..... _.__ ................ t:.. ..... ~-v'""'- ;J V .,..... .J. • ,. .... ~J..... -·· "'-v-'-'- ... -
t::c ~~rope~, Co::::::unities since 1970), Revue tri~estrielle du droit 
eurc:;:&en (~uarterly review of European Law), 1973, p 695. 
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dis:ri:ution of tte pa~ents ~ade, can be regcrced as tte first ~:age 
of a deeper analysis of incidence. The ouestio~ \·:to is res:::n~:.::e fer 
pay:..er.ts of d~ty and transfers of Frice-adjust~er.t levies ar.d ~t~es of 
va~ue-added tax to the Co~=unity budget brings us to t:.e p~cb:e~s, already 
referred to, of the passing en of charges by one region to ar.ot~er. Cn 
tl:e basis of assur.:ptions resarding such passing-on of charges, ..,.-tich ta.tce 
into account regional patterns of consumption of dutiable goods ar.d goods 
~~tject to market regulation, other results are reached (eg ccr.:pare 
cclu~n 6 and Colurr~ 2 in Table 1). 
\".'e can only refer briefly to the effect of the European unit of account 
(L~~) on financing quotas; until 1978 it had fixed parities and differed 
fro~ the ~arket excha~ge rate of the currencies of the r.:e~ter countries 
(see footnote to Table 1 of the docu~entation). wnen excha~ge rates 
had teen allowed to float the r.:arket rate dropped below tte dor::est:.c rate 
(budt;et unit of account) for the hard-currency countries wtile the o;posite 
was t:r...:.e for the soft-currency countries. Fror.: ttis situation it i~ 
concluded that the hard-currency countries were paying relative:y too 
much to the Cor.:~nity budget a~d the soft-currency countries too litt:e 
(see Tacle in Anr.ex 2). 
\-Ji th the change to the ne\V EUA the discrepancies beb:een the r.:ar~et a::d 
conver~ion rates becor.:e less i~portant. Excha~ge at r.:ar~et rates in 
1973 r::ear.t a saving of national currency for the revaluir.g countries a~d 
a greater eA~enditure of national currency for the devaluing co~ntries. 
Fhet!-J.er this also applies to own resources is in doubt, as these a.re only 
trc:..nsferred via r:1e:-:-.ber countries for tec!-.nical reasons. T::e revenue-
.. rai~i:-1; jurisdictic:1 for O\·.rn resources rests 'v.'i th t::e Co:::~ur.i ty a::d 
dis:re:;:ancies bet\-1een the r..arket rate and the do:::cstic rate car.nct 
t!:erefore af!'ect the le\·el of the rele·:r·nt financinc qc:.ot.s.s. I!' \·le 
follm·: tl:is ar~r.:er.-c the dif!'erences in rate~ up to 1977 would on::.:r 
have teen i:::port~~t as regards t~c level of the financial cor.tribut~ons. 
If the ~::u-!:et rates are accepted as a s:yster:: of val:.:.ation t::e 
harc-cu=rer.c~· countries \vere then paying !':".ore and t!-.c soft-currenc:: 
cc:.:.ntric.s less to the Co:Tt-;.ur.i ty "tudcet. The excess pay:::ent :-:.:::ie per 
unit of ~ccc:.:.nt by the Federal Repu~lici of Ger~any, as a har~-c~rrer.cy 
co-:.:ntry, ':io:.:.ld then h.s.ve c.:::ounted to ti:e difference tet\·leen ~:·: ;.~6 a."ld 
t:-_e Cl.::'!"E;!:t ~.c.rl:et rate, ,_.;hich ,,.,c:;.c lo\,'er. 'Y::is excess -;:n~.--:::er.t ::: t!:e 
:-. .:.rc-c:.:.rrcnc:,· co-..:ntries WP!:: co1.;.ntcracted in tl" . .::t t!ie G::? ::h::1res of t:=-.e 
~e~ter cot:.r.tries in tl:c Cc::::-:1-;.nity prod1.;.ct, which t.::ve for~ed t!:c t~sis 
"!er c:;....:.c:.;.:..E!::.r_~ t::e f:.r:~'lcicl contributicns si:1ce 1975, v.ere c.2..sc, 
ur.ti: ~9r7, c~::.cu~.::teti on tte basis of the budcct units of c.cco:.:.r.t 
(c::-ici.::::. :;::.ritic.:;) n.r.C. ·,:ith this va!uation tr.e ?edcr:::.l ::\epub:ic !:c:.::! 
c:.. .:::::.::-.::.1'-'r .::~.::re in t!"'.c :::.."'uropea.~ proC.~ct than would have been the cc.se 
:.: :.:-. .:: cc:-.:=i"::;~:icn !la~ been calculated fro:-:1 r::arket prices. I::-. ct::er 
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.... ores, the national product co:werted at Di-: 3.66 ;er ua is !c•.-:e!" t!:a.n 
t!:e national product ex:;ressed in ua at the r::arket rc.te of :::: 2.~1 
(v3l~e at 1 February 1977). In this cor~ection the 3undest::~ 
oai'-tains that the e!:ect of the exch~Ge rate alreedy de~critcc 
""ould be greater th~~ the effect of this valuation basis, but disresards 
the fact tho.t the effect of the exchn."lGe rate decreases if we accept the 
abcve ar;u:::ent on the disrec3rd of o~m resources. In this case ~~e 
effect of the exchange rate r:ould apply only to the financial 
contributions ~~d the relative fina~cing ~uotas based on ~ar~et 
rates would be raised ouch less than the Bundesbank assuces1J. 
2.2.1.2 7he der.:~d for redistribution and its 
feasibilit-Y 
In v:i.e\·: of t:te i::-:portance that has e:::erced of regional redistrib.:tion 
for furt::.er integration and having re3ard to the fact that expenditure 
fro::: the Co~~nity budget is being used to a greater extent in t!:e 
interests of redistribution, t:te ~art played by reve~ue as a~ instru=ent 
of regional redistribution co:::es into the picture2 ). How s=all its 
influence has so far been co::-:pared with expenditure in existing federal 
a~d unitary states can be seen in Table 3 of the Annex, ~t:!-.ere the 
MacDouGall Group has tried to show the do:::estic po .... er for regicnal 
redistribut:cn of the central or federal finances ( 1::i th e:cvern::-:e'-t 
s1:ares betv:een 20 and 25%). If the Co=::-:uni ty finances were really to 
ac~ieve t!:e sar.;e importance in the future (after a s~itable inc!"ease)3), 
with a hi£;!:.er progression on the revenue side, it would be :;>cssit:l..e to 
reach a des::.!"ed r::ea.sure of redistribution with a slo·.·!er-cro:-:ing b~cc;et 
1) In t!:is co!'l."lection see \·J. Heck, "Die neue Eu!"op!!isc1:e ::::ec:: .. "':un;~e:.:-.:::.ei t 11 
('.:"::e ne:: :u~opean unit of acco~nt), •.:irtschaftsdienst, (Zco'-c:::ic Service) 
r:c 2, ~?~2, !=P 27 et se~q. 
2) ~:.;.t see al.so t::-.e vie':~ e:·:r-:-es.sed by Vcllerttun at a.~ ea:-:ier s:a:e of 
iL~~~r~~~on t~8t :~ere is a ccnt:-3dictic~ between t~e i~~erc:~~: 
c:::-:.r-- c~c:r : f ccver~:7ents ~d t!:e ~rc::re~sicn oric!'ltcC c!'l i::C~ ,:·:c~:::.l 
=-:. '._; c2.:crthur:, ''?:.r:2~z·.:i!"-:~~!::1:t:i c!: ~ F :-c :::.. c-.e :.:-. ter-
r:.:_::.·:~;::.~~ Cr-c::::i=::::..tioner.. Ur:ter te~onderer E:i.!c!:::ic:::i~=:; C.:~ 
..:..'..:.r::::>:!~~-c:-~cn Ge~·.ein::c:.::.:tcn" (l=:-oble:::s of !'inc_::=:.a:. r..a.."la,:e:::c'-t i'-
i!'l:~:-:lr.::~:cnol ~~6L-~i:.at:.cns. \·!i th ST'ecial re:ere~ce to "t!:c :::..:~c~e3..!1 
Co··_:-"..:ni tic::>~, Jis::e:-t::t:.on, P.c:.G.elberg 1968, p 21 et seq. 
3) If tte fi:-. .::.r.ce:: \ve!"e shifted "upwarC.s" this situation would r.ecessc:.rily 
afi'ect tt.e r-.ational po-.cr of redistribution. 
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than if redistribution were achieved solely via e~endit~re1 ). 
If, in spite of possible objectio::s based on grc\._·th, inter-State 
redistribution is in the forefront a~d if Co~~nity expendi~~re ~~d a 
torizo~tal fiscal adj~st~ent are disregarded, Co~~unity fin~~cir.3 co~l~ 
contribte tov:ards redistribution in that it \o:ould :::ake rich couz:-:ries 
tea:- a tigger burden ar.d poor countries a s~aller turde~ . . ~n co:::;,c::J..so!'l 
~it~ a capacity indicator. This levelling effect could also be described 
as a ''vertical distri'c~tion of revenue with a horizontal effect". It 
see::-.s, ho,..;ever, that the use of regional policy to affect a~ti tuC.es by 
~eans of the revenue side - by disproportionate over or ~~der-taxation -
Financing could be used 
to influence the attitudes of countries contrib~ting a relatively s~a:l 
a:::cun-: if 11regional tax concessions" \-Jere t;ranted only where evicier.ce ...-as 
brou~ht of the ret;icnal assista~ce required. 
are si::-.ilc.r to the adjustr::ent :::ectanis::t worked out in 1975, \·:hich :provides 
for "re-transfers" in certain cases but had not been applied up to 19792). 
7o red~ce econo~ic differences the Co~ission proposes a corrective 
factor which would establish politically an apportio~~ent for~la for 
the revenue-raising pm·!er or ability to contribute of the ce::tber cour.tries. 
A give~ difference of incor.1e between two countries would then :::ea~ that 
1) If there were a,Cc~nunity effort which raised the European s~are fro~ 
0.8 to 2-2.5~;, the EacDougall Group expects that differe:1ces in i::co::::e 
in a Cc~::uni t;y of I·:ine would drop by 10;,), at least if t::is :=::.:.ro:;:ea...~ 
activity covered ree;ional, labour, market a~d econo::iic action so that 
::ax:..:-:u~ pc·.·er of redistribution Hith a given t::.r~cn c:: ~te buC.t:et v:as 
tt~ c'::·ject::.·:e. Beside this o==ti:::idic ex:::ectc.ticn t!':ere are scc..e very 
scter estir.ates. If fiscal adju~tr.1ent is re~~rdcd es n po:itical 
;rob2.c:-. \·:~1ict is e";·e:l 2-es~ nr.-.enuble to rationc;.l sol:.l::c:: ir.te!'::~t:..o::a!l:l 
t}:.::..., 0~ D. r:ntlo~al plc....~e, 11 \·:e \;o-..:2.d ?r0'::3.tly be \·!ell ncvi~cd :lOt to 
e::::"c::t too :::u~:-. fro::-. an ir.ternationa2. or sur;ra:::atio:-.al ficc:::.l 
c::.~~;..::t:-.e::t of t~.i£: kir.ci". ~ee K. 3cl::::idt, "Zur Koord:na-::.(:r: vcr: 
.':t·~:.!er:! tc::. \·:irt~cnaftlic!:cr I:1ter;:-ation 11 ( Tl:e CccrC:ir.at!c!1 c: ta.xes 
i:: ec:-:-.:-:-.:.c inte:::;r.J.tion), :=: • ..,cr-~ciccr (ed), 11";,'eltv::.r-t.sc:::::.::::..c:-:e 
Frot~ e-e C.:·:- :.s[Cn\,·c.rt, Schriften des Verei:1.s flir .Soci&J.Fo::..i -::.~:" 
('.:cr:!.i ccc~c:::ic Dro'tle~·.s cf t!:'.e -creser.t, Fa-:;ers of tl:e .:..ssoci:;.:ion fer 
c . - ) • . " 1 :.5 .., , . :, c ... - 4", wCC:.:::.l rc2.:.cy , ne~ ce::-:..2s, ~o ) , LCr-1n •,o;, p CO. 
2) .Sec Joc-:..e~:~:~:.c::, ? 7' :..~d. for :::ore details, .:; .~. Dcd.S\\Crt!':, 11::S~rc;:ean 
;:c7""_~::.:::. t:; ?:..~.~c:r .. c: ~"1 ~~o.l~tsis of the DJ.bli!'l ~er.C..":e!'!t", Jot:.~a: of 
Cc:·_-::cr. !·::;.r:-:et Studies, Vol .XIV, 1976, pp 129 et seqq. 
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t~e r~c~er count~y would not o~ly pay the propo~tionate rate tut would 
also tave to transfer additional funds1). This ~P?le~ent co~ld te 
calculated by ap~lying the corrective factor to t!:e underlyi.::g :::~~ ca::;..:t 
cap~city to pay (e; GDP, consu~ption, personal inco=e) and r.~ltiplying 
t!:is index by the average per caput inco~e of the Co~~nity and t~e 
population figure at the ti=.e. Tr.e resulta~t relative shares cculd t!:e~ 
be applied to any basis of assess~ent (see Table 4 in the Ar~ex). 
An alternative to alicnment with the gross national Froduct would te an 
'h f' th 1 f · · 2 ) If l.·t l.·s tc ,..e approac .•• ro:n e eng_e o revenue-ral.sl.r..g po\·Ier • _ '"' 
calculated on tte basis of personal inco~e (pe~sonal inco~e tax capaci~y 
key), it would be necessary to pick out from the national product 
calculation the value corresponding to the basis of assess~ent for 
income tax. In Table 2 this basis of assessment y is entered in 
n 
Colur:.n 1. A new basis of assesswent \-ri th a higher variance, ie bisger 
differences of financial strength between "poor" and "rich" countr:es, 
is calculated as follovJS: ~~ultiply the difference Ax by a :acto~ F, 
n 
add 100, divide this s~rn by 100 and multiply the whole expression by t!:e 
average Cor.c.unity income y. These values are described as tte co~rected 
personal incorne base (Index II). The surn of the inco~es obtained ir.. the 
Co~unity and the income tax paid on them gives the average rate of tax 
in the Corrc.unity (t). If the new assessment basis (Index II) is 
~ltiplied - for each country - by the nurnter of persons sainfully 
ernployed (En) and the aYeraGe rate of tax (t') a new basis is obtai:::ed 
( - . perEcna~ lnco~e tax capacity) fer the calcub.tior. o: r.e\,' fina:::c:.:::s 
quotas (personal incor.:e tax capacity key). The values calculated in the 
co:::text of tte ap;roach fro::: tr.e a.'lt;le of reve~ue-raising :po-..:e::- ea:: 'te 
juxtaposed ~-:i th the cou~ tries' sha:es of GDP - according to purc::asir..g 
poHer and exchange rates. 
~"is c~lculatio~ procedure involves a nu~ber of technical ar..d st~tist::.c~ 
C.eci.:::!.c:-.s \·::::..c:-. affect ttc econc::1ic force of the revenue-rn::.s~:::::; :;o·.-.er 
1) S(;t.: ".?ir:r...'1zie:ru:::::; des Ge::iein.scl-~~:ts!:ausl:al ts - l:Ur.fti.:;e r:ct:O.ode" 
(?:..::.::.c:.::: tr.e Co:-::-:uni ty Eudt;et - :Future :::et!".od), 3ulletin of t.::-.c 
?'. 
~~ 
":"u~--r -.,. "'r---ur:~ ... ,. -:- .. ~...,lc..,c"'t 0 /,..." '""' 21 
- - '""'.'-'~......._ ... ..., ............ ,.,._ ... ..,, ' ..;,~_...,_-' •·~ •• V { ...,, ~ • 
:~-.'2- :·.:.c~c:..:.~~l G:-c:.;.:-.~ pr0!"crc e-"1 i!"" ... :.ic.J.tor cf rever::.:.e-~c.:s:.:-.- --:::· .. e:- to 
::::.:.c::.. :.::o:J o: !iatic::;:;.: ca?aci t:r avni:~b:e di.rec: f~o::1 t!:e c:-i:.c:l:a~ic~ 
o: t:.e ::at.ior..c.l prod~ct. See Vol II, pp 457 et .seq. See a:.so 
G. :::c:it:~~·?t ".:..e!"...rbuch der Fina.'1Z\·:issenscho.ft11 (::anu.:?2 of t!:e t:-.ec::-y of 
:;:-;.;.blic f:..:::a.~ce), 2nd edition, NeU\.;ied 1977, p 69, a'1d ·,;. ·,·:it-::-:a"'.n, 
":.:i:::.f~!-.rung in l!ie .Fi.Danzwissenschaft11 (Introductio~ to the tt.eor:; of 
public fin.x:ce), Fart III, 2nd edition, Stuttt;art, r:ew York 1976, p 115. 
·. 
Tt,hle 2: Cl'lculnlion of a personal income tn.x ca;w.city key 
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ap:r;roach. In particular the choice of the proxy asses~~e~t c~=e and 
the type of tax has effects \ ... r.ich are specific to a t:iven cc~~tr:t; 
tl:ese hove an appreciable in!'h:.~~ce on tr.e revenue-rc.i=i~;:; r;o· .. :cr l':·~:r 
and in theory can also produce an adjust~ent attitude ~ the cc~tr:.es. 
Ber.ind all these different proble::~s, r.O'IIever, there is tr.e basic 
question as to indicators of national capacity and it is difficult to 
justify the use of revenue-raising indicators for the pur?oses of 
international comparison instead of existing and harmonized nat:.c~al 
product values. 
Tne proposed lioitation of consideration to the effects of regional 
distribution on the revenue side must not blind us to the fact that in 
the political conflict as to the proper burden of contributions, the 
probler.1 of the 11 juste retour", ie the balance bet\•een pa~ents to t~e 
Co~~unity budget and benefits received by the member countries, is in 
tr..e fore:rcnt. This disputed co::lparison of pa~ents and benefits produces 
tr..e level of net receipts or net pay::~ents, which ~ay be regarded as the 
vol~e of redistribution. It shows how much inter-State redistribution 
has taken place in consequence of Co~unity financing. 
2.2.2 r:et transfer accounts and inter-State redistributic~ 
~e argu~ents relating to countries are widened if reverse flows of 
d . ._ 1) f th c 't b d t t th b "" -expen ~~ure rem e o~r.un~ y u ge o .e rr.em er coun~r~es are 
1) The expenditure side is also affected by the valuation of tl:e ~~it 
of acccu.:1t. Until 1977 pa~~ents outside agric~:;_ tu::-e \·!C!"e ~;:~ect 
to tr.e official conversion rate; since 1972 t!:e:: have fo:;.lo· • .-ed 
the ~a::-Y.et ~over.1ents of the LUA and r.ave therefc::-c :ee:;. lo· .. :e::- fc::-
t!'le ?edcral Re:?ublic of Ger~cny. \:l:ere3.= ex;;endi turc on c:ricul t-..:.:-e 
~.~ sccial security accrJes a:.d is reraid in r.;ticn~: curren:~, t~ere 
s.:e ·w"a!"i2.1: ts i~ ttc cnse c: t:: e ~c:.~i c::.n2. ::\;.~~:. :::--:::: ,_ :-.. :.c:: c;:: o: :.s :..~ 
ua 2ra de~er=i:;.cd for ~e~ter St3tcs ever t~e lcn: ter~; ~~ ~he c~5e 
c~ ~he ~: t~e equivnlect c! these drc,~ed o~ the i~trc~~c~i=~ c! t~e 
':".::ere ':Jculd be furt!".er r~~crcussions if :.he -::,:, c~:.~e:i to be 
a cleuri::g ur.i t and becc:..."::e a p:.~·:-e:;t ~edi::.l~ so t:.c:t tte :::e:.:c-r 
co'il::.t~ies t·:o:1ld tave to be.::..r tr.e e:-~c::~Ge rate ris:--:. ~ee :, • ::ec~:, 
"Die neue Euro~~isc!:e Recl:r.un;seir.hei t" ( ':'!: -- r.ev1 :S:.:.rot:eD..!: ~.it o~ 
account), ~.'irt;chaftsdienst (:::cono=ic Service), !·:o 2,-1978,:? 91. 
.. 
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calculated accordi~gly and co~?ared in turn with capacity ir.dicato~s. 
Table 3 shO\oJS flo~-:s of funds back to l·~e::>ber States in '1977, in tctcL. 
C.."ld by types of expenditure. In the last colu::-.n total "rcpoy:::e:.:.::." 
c:.d s!'.ares of G::J? are co::::pa:ed. Tr.e co:-.parison sl:ows that all 
co~tries except France, Ger~any ~"ld Luxecbourg receive core than is 
proportionate to their share of GDP. 
A distribution of funds ano:ng t·:e:nber States classified by type of 
eX?enditure and by country gives a first basis for analyses of re£io~al 
incidence or the extent to which the regions are affected by expenditure; 
t~e ~ettodical proble~s of this do not differ in principle fro:n those of 
regional analysis on the national plane and may be specified separately 
!or a~ricultural, regional or social expenditure. The question arises 
whether the analysis should be confined wholly to an exa.~inaticn of the 
flo\·i of funds to the regions and exclude processes of the appro:;:riation 
of be"-efits to the regions in order to go beyond the deter:nination of 
forr.~ ir.cidence. As regards the attribution of expenditure or services 
to regions, procedure could then be si:nilar to that fer the distribution 
of public services arr.ong different strata of the population1 ). In all 
cases the objective of regional attribution will be to show the influence 
specific tc the Co~~nity • In the present context the i~port~"lce of 
the return-flow calculations appears in the balancing of outward !"lc111S 
ar.d return fl0\vs2 ). 
1) See K.-D. Her.ke, "Die Verteilur.g von GUtern und :::>iensten c:uf 
verschieder.e Bev!:Hkerunt;sschichten" (':'he Distribution of goods a."ld 
se~vices ~.or.s various strcta of the population), G~~tin~en ~S~5, 
p 1C3 et seq~, and in the recio"-a: context, R. Ti~~er, K. ~o;:cr, 
1 '2~~ Reg:.o::.;.:::.isie!"Ur..g des Eu!:d.es!':::.u~!:e.l ts: Raur.-:or=.::"..!~~~pcl::.. t:.sc!'-.e 
- 1ecicutu::.t; ur..d c:npirisc::-.e Erceb:1isse" (?.e:iona~:.::atio"- o: t:-;,e ?eC:eral 
b.:c;:et: Its ir.yor:.::r..cc to rccionc.l policy il!ld e--::;:i::-ic::.l reS".:::::), 
P.:i~~-.::.che ~·!ir::unccn ~:fcntlic!".cr .:.u:::::-::.'::e::, Ve::-e:: ..:::::~:c::-.:.:.r.:~n ce::-
_:..::·.'2c-ic fUr Rr<:.1:-:forsc:-.unc; ur..d Landcs;JlC...>J.ur.::;, Fo::-sc:·.:.;.::,:-:::;- t:r.:i 
.Si ~::·,;.:-.-:!0·::.'2::-ic~tc (P.2r.;ional ef:cc~.s o: ::::.;,8lic ex::c:::..i.: ::.;.~c, ~-..:.~::c~ticns 
c: ~~c ~c&~e~y fo~ regio~~l re~earc~ ~C ~ar.d ~:~~i~:, ~e~€::c~ ~d 
C ~.,:·~cr"" ro~or ...... ) "o1 r/' t,:..,,.,O"e,.. ..,a.-c:: ~ 21 7 e• -e,...,. --~ 
- •. - ·.:.. ... .. ..., ·- - ... :· ... ._ , • - /V' ··~· - - I ~ ( ./ ' __ • ~ ""' ::..,; --:\. ~, ~ ....... 
!:. :::-.:::er:c.::-.::n, 11Jcr:;io:1:1lc Ir.::idenz de:- ~~fen~::.icl-.cn Rec.l trc::.::e~::; -
:~c:2.c:-:c ::.:-er er.:;iri::cl:cr: Er:-:i tt:!_unc" ( :~c~io~:1l i!'lcider.ce of ~1.:~::.c 
r- ..... •- ...... -=- 1 • ,...,..(""r- -c:"" .,... bl -~ .. --.:-.:c ..... ~ .... .,.._.:_!"'it.:,..,.,...' ,. -~""'-... .r (ed'; ···'-"~'-'---'-- ~r ......... e.o- rro e ... .;;> c. c ... _._ .... :1- C.~e .. e •.. - .• .:. _..,_.,, .· .• ~---- , 
"?rc1::c'"":"'.'tere:c::e der Verteil~r..cs- U!:~ ~oz~nl!'olit:=.:~, 3:::--....:-i:t::--_ C.:.s 
:?:tc~::aticr:::.:crl I!"lstit'..lts fU~ :S;.:~:!"'isc:-~e Sczi: .. lt:S~·::!"' .. :;.ie (I::::::::.s:.n 
(:~c~:e~~ c: C.i!:tr:.~ut~c:1 and coci~2. :o~:i.c:r, ra~s:-~ c: t::~ ::--~~e~:::;.-::c:::.:!. 
:nstitute for E:::pirical Scci3l Eccnc=y), ;o! 2, ~er:in ·?~3, ~ 3~3 et se~~ 
2) Ai"te::- ::::.::h ::-.csi t:ition C...'"ld r..3r.:,• rese:-;aticr..s t:"'.e Cc--:::-issio:: decided to 
produce r..et accounts for 1976/77, ns fiC".l!"es \··1-:.:c:-: :·.ere often :::isle:1dinr 
~ere tro~b~t U? at the discu~sion cr.. ir.tcc::-~tio'- ?o:icy. See ~~t:e 5 o! 
the ~.r.nex. See nlso .Statistische Beihefte zu den ::cr..atsberic:-.ten der 
Deutschen E~ndesb~"lk (Statistical supplc~er..ts to t::e ~onthly reports of tt 
Deutsche Eur..desb~"lk(, Series 3, Zahlunc~bila~=statistik, (Ealance of 
• . • .. ~ -·~-- .... _,.,._·--· '"('""'(") -~ L~ ;.,.. .,,.,,. ;;-,.~.,,.."', Minif'trv of 
Table 3: 
Belr;iw: 
Gcrm<~n:,· 
.franc<: 
Itnly 
Luxerr.l·ourg 
tlethcrJ unds 
Der.r.:nrk 
Irclund 
United Kin.:;dor.t 
Cor.:muni ty 
~hnren in return floHS of funds by r·:ember Staten in 1977 
( 1'1 i 11 i. ~) !1 ; :u t'l ) 1 ) 2 ) 3) 
Gill-' l'orulntion ~uropenn Ar,riculturnl Socinl 
Guidnncc and Gunr<::.ntcc :Fund Jo'und 
Guarantees 
~~) 
Guidnncc 
rneanuren 
c' t.J % (!I /V abs % abs et ,o abs 
( 1) (~) ( 3) ( ~~) (5) 
LV 0 i r o r i g i nay 
Her;ionnl 1'otnl (7) . . 
Fund 
ot 
N nbs % nbs 
(6) (7) (8) 
1) The Tcble covers only the 4 Funds (EAGGF (2), Social li'und, Rer,ional Fund). Other categories of expcndi ture, 
such as ndr.Jinintro.tion, rcscnrch und development, and development nid, \lhich account for, c:;ay, 1a;~ of total 
exy;enditurc, nre dicrcccrdcd in the allocation. 
2) 'l'hc voriouc uni tn of ncco,_mt uncrl in the annual reports arc all converted into EUA. 
3) ln the cu.;.c of the .structural fundn (Her;ional I•'lmd, .Socio.l l"und o.nd B1>GGF, Guirl;mce Section), the floviS of 
p<tyr.:cnt rclotc to co:r.::-.itr.·,cnt authoriz<1tionc; in the case of the EAGGF, Guarantee Section, they relate to 
payment nutLoriz:~tionc. 
(1) 
Lf) Corrcr;!•ondc to the l·~CA nccounting syr.tcm before J.:ay 1976. For an explanation of the b-10 accountinG method~• nee 
\.'ritten <.,uc::;tion J:o (,c;l;j'/), 1020/77, C.0?/?8 from llr Cointnt nnrl Lord Desnborouch to the Comr.tir>Gion of the l.uropcnn 
Co;:.r:uniticc, (;ff:ici:.-11 Journal of the European Cor:munitics Ho C 2:1/1, 31 January 19?9; the nrnounts sho\·:n :in the 
tnble :in thr; \·:d ttcn qucction for the net tram:;fcrs (difference b£'hJcen the return flmm via the aprroprintc 
expcndi tu re fund:3 nnd j nflmm of financial renource[;) nre lmncd not on comr.li tmPnt nuthorizatj om; but on p:1yr.:ento 
nctunlly r:o.l;c; thi:::: t<:l.lc, Hld eh is reproduced in the Official Journal, shm:s the net trannfers for 1T?6 nnd 
1<)'/'l for both MCA nccountinr: methods. 'l'hcrc the cxpendi ture is m:;.sicned to the H(·lilbcr 0tLtte::; ;md thP 
adr..ini:;Lr:..~tivc cxp<:rrceG are nttributcd to the Benelux countricn. 
l>r;··.:n up nr.r.l c~lculnted fror.t the Annual Reportn of the 
di ffcrcnt 1-in:c!~. 
I 
.f:" 
N 
I 
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1) Without disputing the political importance of "net accounts" , 
"equivalence financing" of the Community is not in the spirit of the 
Co~-unity nor does it comply with the letter of the EEC Treaty and the 
Merger Treaties. If a "juste retour" in the sense of a balance between 
payments made and repaytnents or benefits received nevertheless freq~ently 
appears to be a guiding principle of fin~~cing in day-to-day politics, 
the distributive function of the Community budget is greatly restricted. 
If the actual expenditure was charged to those benefiting froc it in 
the form of a costs levy, the Community would be unable to perfor~ its 
task of regional redistribution or could only do so at the cost of 
concessions in other fields2 ); to this extent "equivalence thinki::g" 
is one of the causes of the growth of the Community budget. At the 
sar.e tioe the use of net accounts is evidence of a certain hostility to 
integration or suggests a lack of solidarity. It recalls the attecpt of 
mez::bers of an insurance society to "get back" as much as they ea.~ in 
paynents and benefits over and above the contributions they have paid. 
If the 11 juste retour11 is really to be regarded as a financing maxim, at 
least all the other advantages of integration, such as the elimination of 
customs duties, the diversion and creation of trade flows with their 
associated effects on prosperity, and all the disadvantages of integratio~ 
would have to be quantified in money terms and compared in a cost-benefit 
analysis3). To this end it would be necessary to consider the total 
re~~latory activity of the Community together with its bud~etary activity. 
T.~e intermittent advantages and disadvantages of integration would have to 
be considered in just the same way as the activities of the Euro~ean 
In•est~ent Ear~, the Euronean Coal and Steel Co~T.Unity and the European 
Develo~ment ~Jr.d4 ). For all these reasons we must largely agree with 
1) Even i:: the context of fiscal adjustment within the Federal Re~ublic the 
ne~ nositicn is i~nortant to the views of the UL~der on the refer~ of 
§~ ~1a and 104a of- the Basic Law. It would be logical fer tte recipient 
~der to be in favour of continuance of Co~~nity expenditure and for 
the dcr.~r ~der to oppose it. 
2) Cee K. Redi~:, "Zur Problexatik eines Fin~~zaus;leichs in der ~Jrop~ischen 
Ge::::::!i::.:::c!'::lft" (The problcr.:s of fiscal adjustr.:ent in tl':.e Et::o:;::ea::1 Co::--":luni ty), 
H.v.d. Groeben, H. Mtlller (ed), ~:tlglic:~eiten und Grenzen einer Euro~~ische: 
Union (C~portunities and limits of ~~ropean union), Vel 2, lee cit, p 2o6 
et seqc:. 
3) E. ::..:.=..::..:.::::a, "':'race Creation and Diversion in the E~ope~~ Cc::-.:::cn ~arket: 
l.r1 A::::r::.:.~3.l of ~:::c ~vic.er.ce", B. Ballassa ( ed), European Econo::1ic 
Integration, Ar.:sterd~~ 1975. 
4) For exa:1ple, as a "quid pro quo" for the desired r.:e:-:bersl':.ip of the E:<S, the 
United Kinbdo~ der.~~ded an improvement of its net tr~~sfer position and 
Irela~d an increase in direct grants from the Regional Fund. Finally, in 
the case of Ireland, the grant was r::ade via the :..'..lro::ean Invest:::ent Bar.k se 
as not to involve the European Parliament - at the wish of the French. 
.· 
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Reister in regard to the incidence level of inco~ing fu~ds a~d pa~ents 
of contributions if analysis of the flow of paycents "solely fro:::1 the 
point of view of setting the financial contributions paid by a Y.e~ter 
State against the benefits received" is regarded as an "inefficient a~d 
limited attempt to ~easure the worth a cou.~try derives from ~e=bersr~p111 ). 
Ulti~ately it will depend on the awareness of integration ~d solidarity 
how lcng considerations of this kind continue to be important. It 
certai~~Y should not be forgotten that even at national level such :atters 
are carefully weighed up when carginal changes in revenue-raising 
regulations are conternplated2). 
2.2.3 Further-reaching analyses to determine the regional incidence 
of Comrnunitv financing 
Apart from overall net transfer accounts, partial net accounts can be 
produced and other Co~xrunity institutions can also be taken into 
consideration. Overall offsetting conceals the possibility that in the 
case of partial offsetting a country will be in a position different fro= 
that in the case of overall accounting. Still more importance attaches 
to analyses which depart from the status quo and either simulate 
alternative Co~~nity policies or examine hypothetical situations in 
the absence of the Corr~nity. The suggestion often made that accounts 
with and without the existence of the Co~nity or with and without its 
budget are irrelevant can be countered by the argument that in this way 
co~parative standards are found which help in assessing the further 
develop~ent of integration. Disagsregation of the net transfer accot:.nt 
will occur if various expenditure progr~nes are analysed in respect of 
t~eir incidence, including their financing. 
In calc~latinb partial budget incidence tre question arises as to wr.at 
1) E. ::eister, 11Haushal t unci Fina"lzen der :Surop!:l.iscten Ger::einsctaften" 
(~uc~et and finances of the European Cor.~nities), Baden-Eaden 1975, 
p 9('. 
2) Eee a~so the Study of the European Parli~ent, The effects of (sic) 
tte Dnited Ki~gdo~ of ~er::bership of the European Co~~Jnities, 
Fecr-..:.ary 1975. 
3) On the rez-.llts of s:..1ch accounts see E. Reister, "Haustalt und Finanzen 
der Europl!ischen Gemeinschaften", loc cit, p 100 et seqq. 
•' 
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receipts and expe~ses can be usefully co~pared if the basis is the 
ncn-allocation principle. Should a category of expenditure be 
"accour.ted for" (a) in proportion to the distribution of total i~co::~e 
accordir.g to me~ber countries, (b) in proportion to the part of t~e 
Co~~ity budget financed by individual income items or (c) in proportion 
to the financing structure of the growth rate of the Comcunity budget? 
For an analysis of his sector the Federal Minister of Food, Agriculture 
and Forests selected the proportional approach. According to ttis t~e 
Federal Republic paid a net 687 million ua in the agriculture sector in 
19761). On the basis of a comparable approach Scheper arrives at the 
figure of DM 1496 million as the actual burden for 1976. In his case 
the "financial transfer from the Federal Republic to the Con:cunity budget 
for farming purposes" includes "the financial contribution of the budgets 
of the Federal Republic for farming purposes ••• 11 
"the part of the Community's own resources for farming purposes ••• ", 
2) ie price-adjustment levies, countervailing import levies and sugar duty • 
Instead of the proportional approach, therefore, Scheper chooses 
assu=:ptions based on a factual connection between "agricultural revenue" 
and "agricultural expendi ture11 • 
The results of other Community policies could also be si~lated, for 
exa~ple an agricultural policy hypothetically converted to direct inco~e 
aids3). Finally, questions could be asked about a situation without a 
Co~r.unity, or without a Community budget, and by mea~s of assur.ptions a 
standard situation for assessment could be created, for exa~ple the 
bilateral coordination of international tasks or the performance of 
1) ~~rarbericht (Agricultural Report) 1978, Bur.desrat document 50/78 of 
3 Fe:truury 1973, p 65. 
2) See \·l. Sche~er, "Gesar::twirtschaftliche U:::verteilungseffekte der 
Acrarpolitik, Referat fUr die Jahrest3o-ung des Vereins flir Social-
politik" (Economic redistribution effects of the agricultural po.l.l.cy, 
F~~er :or tte ~~u~l cc~ference of t~e Association for Social Folicy), 
1°7:, cu0~icatcd in manuscript form, p 11. 
3) Sec ·.·J • .Uters, "Die \o/irkunc von Agrarsubventionen auf Allol.;~ncn und 
Vertei::.~n~" (The effect of agricultur.:U subsidies on allocat:c:1 a::d 
cistritution), G. Scrr.idt, H. Steir.hauser (ed), Planung, Durctflitrung 
t:r:i r:o:--.t:-o:.2e der i''i:1:tr.zier~:1g von Lar.dwirtsd:aft ur:d J..;;r<1r~o:i tif., 
Schriften der GesellGctaft ftir WirtGchafts- und Sozialwizse:1~chaften 
de~ La::cbaues e.V. (Plannin~, irnple~entation a~d control of the fi~a~cir.g 
of far~ing a~dcrricultural policy, Papers of the Society for Ecor.o~ic a~d 
Social Sciences in F~ing), Vol 15, Munich, Basle, Vienna 197c, p 33 et 
seqq~ a:1d t;. KoeJ;.ter9 11EG-:..grarpolitik in der Sackgasse 11 (Co::-.r::unity 
agricultural policy at a dead end), Baden-Baden 1977, p 159 et seqq. 
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natio:r.al tasks. As regards the objective of redistribution between 
States assu~ptions would have to be made as to alternative attitudes in 
the absence of the Comounity; as regards fin~~cing it would be necessary 
to co~sider what the national burden would be if natio~al and bilateral 
agreements took the place of Co~~nity regulations. With regard to custo~s 
receipts reference situations in the absence of a custo~s union could be 
thought out and on the basis of these calculations could be cade as to the 
level which would have been reached by national custocs receipts1) 2). 
Whichever type of incidence analysis is preferred, it is ~~ikely that its 
res~lts will coincide with those of a method based solely on flows of 
payoents, and political decisions will have to be reached on an insufficient 
basis. 
1) See H. Vollerthun, "Finanzwirtschaftliche Problerne internationaler 
Org~~isation. Unter besonderer Bertlcksichtigung der EuropMischen 
Gemeinschaften" (Problems of financial management in international 
organizations. With special reference to the European Co~nities), 
loc cit, p 89 et seqq. 
2) In the sphere of Community agricultural policy Scheper has, on the basis 
·of certain assumptions, calculated the fiscal effects if "the Cc::-~-:.u:li ty 
of Nine" was changed into "nine mini-Cor::rnunities" and the ni::::e rr.ini-
Co~~nities adopted the same agricultural policy as reeards the part of 
it which is now determined by the Council of Ministers or the Cc~ission. 
The table shows the results of this comparison. As it is assu~ed that 
no changes occur for the producers and consumers of agricult~ral produce, 
the difference shows the extent of the indirect horizontal fiscal 
adjustment in favour of other Co~~nity countries. Tr.is difference 
c~~ also be regarded as the price of the com~on agricultural policy or 
as a contribution towards realization of economic integration. 
Table: The fiscal burden on the Federal Republic of Germany in 
D!~ million under national and :suro"'ear. a~icul tural ':"Olicies 
1971 
11)72 
1973 
1~74 
1975 
1976 
Net transfer from 
Germa"'ly to the 
Corr~unity budget 
for farming 
purposes 
Relief for the 
Ger.:1an budgets 
LVoir originaY 
"Ir.direct 
hori~c::::t~ fiscal 
adj~st::-.ent" in 
favo:.:.r of tl:e 
agriculture sector 
of other Co::-~unity 
cou:1trics 
See ·.:. Scheper, "Gesamtwirtschaftliche Umverteilungseffekte der 
Aer::rpolitik11 (:Sco~o::tic redistribution effects of the agricultural 
policy), loc cit, quotation p 12. 
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A revenue system, which at least does not hold back the future inteb~ation 
process, can be developed from the following criteria which also assist in 
the assessment of the financing proposals; they have been derived from 
the preceding comments. 
A. Economic criteria: 
B. 
National capacity taken into account 
Usefulness for redistribution between regions 
Usefulness for purposes of stability 
Avoidance of distortion of competition 
Legal criteria: 
Own resources system in accordance with Article 201, Treaty of Roce 
C. Integration criteria: 
To strengthen the revenue autonomy of the Co~~ty 
D. Technical criteria: 
hdequate and lasting yield 
Cheapness of collection 
Little need !or harmonization 
Little adverse effect from differing national standards of honesty 
in tax matters 
Little adverse effect on national tax flexibility 
Little effect on fiscal adjustment within the country 
Perceptibility 
Cheapness of payment 
It is clear that so~e of the criteria may be regarded as specific to the 
Cc::::":':11ni t:r ~evcm:.e system so that, exactly as in the case of ratio::.al 
s;rs~s:":'.s of 2.oco.2. a:nr.ori ty revenue, criteria of rationality ~ay be 
fo~r.d for the Co~~nity budget; as standards they are associat~d 
'i:i t::: the general principles of taxation. In the event of objectives 
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conflicting vitt t~e general principles of taxation priority co~ld be 
given to the standards for Community revenue in the interests of 
. . t t' 1 ) progress1ve 1n egra 1on • 
The application of these criteria and their weighting2) depends in the 
first instance on the stage of integration reacted. Tt.e sr.:all fiscal 
needs of a customs union can be covered by a system of contributions to 
costs. Discussion of fiscal adjustment systems will gain i~portance only 
to the extent that supranational tasks have to be performed at successive 
stages of integration. The importance of the criteria therefore depends 
first on the degree of revenue autonomy achieved and secondly on the 
functions allotted to the revenue of a newly created level3). 
Apart fro~ this approach, in which revenue and the system of the vertical 
distribution of funds are regarded as dependent variables, we have the 
1) By analogy with the views of the Economic Advisory Council on the 
relationship of general tax principles to the sta~dards required of 
an appropriate system of local authority taxation, the settle~ent of 
a conflict of objectives in favour of a European revenue syste~ could 
be accepted more readily the greater the share of the tax receipts 
determined by the central authority of the member countries on the 
basis of general tax principles. See Opinion on the local authority 
tax system and local authority reform in the Federal ReFutlic of 
Ger::-.a"ly, 16 l·:arch 1968, Der Wissenschaftliche Beirat bei:::J Bu::des-
ministerium der Finanzen, Entschliessungen, Stellun~ar~en und 
Gutachten 1949-1973 (The Economic Advisory Council at the Federal 
~inistrJ of Finance, decisions, con~ents and opinions) 1949-1973, 
lee cit, p 4o9. 
2) In the past Dosser has pleaded for financing through corporation tax 
and derived this view from the theory of equ~valence. If this view, 
which ~osser related only to the business sector, is shared, the idea 
of ec;uivalence could also be adopted as a sutsidia..~: ccn:i: tic::. for a 
rational revenue system. See D.G.t·~. Dosser, ":;)er Gc:::ei::scha:fts::aus!:alt 
ur:d Cie Haus!:cl te der t·~i tgliedstaaten" ( T:-:e Cc::-.:::-.1n~ t~· 't'.ld;;e:t a::d tr.e 
bu=.;ets of t!:e t·!e:::ter States), ( Cor.:::ission of the furo~ea..~ Co:-:.:uni ties, 
Grc-.;~ of .Ex~erts en Econcr.ic a~d :.:onetc>..ry Union, ~rc;:eo...'1 ec:::c:::ic 
inte~ration ~~d currency union), loc cit C II, p 6C et seq; see a:so 
Y.. ~cr:.idt, ":.:'.lr Refer;.: dcr Unterne!-.:::un£;sbcsteueru::::-;" (Tr:.e rc:for;.: of 
b.:sir.czs t.:..:·:ntior.), Fin~~z..:::.rcl-.iv (Finn..:::cial Records), new series, 
ro. 22, 19C2/63, pp 35 et seqq, particularly pp 50 et sec;q ar.d pp 60 
et seqq. 
3) I~ is not out of the question that if the Co~~nity is enlar~ed a 
di~fcrer.t vertical ~eans of adjustin~ reven'.le will be crea~cd in the 
first place for cou~tries joinin; bec~use the value-added tax 
arr~;e:::e~t presu~poses adjust;.:ent to the har:::onized tasis of 
asses~:::ent. ~t the sa=.e ti~e this means t~at the assess~e~t criteria 
ca~~~ot be applied to all vertical relationship~ and that their weighting 
will differ from one country to another. 
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approach in which revenue is designed to relate to intesration. Tr.us 
the Co~~ity hoped for an impetus towards integration from tr.e own 
resources decision of 1970 and efforts for redistributio~ between 
regions with the aid of revenue point in the sar.e direction. 
In view of the many rational revenue systeos and the circ~stance that 
those in favour of integration of the Corr~ity countries will not bind 
the~selves in advance to any given type or method of integration, we s~all 
not go into the concept of an optimum financing system but in wr~t follows 
will discuss some financing proposals going beyond the status quo, which 
eight be applied \n the case of an economic and monetary unio~ and would 
not endanger still further-reaching efforts for integration for reasons to 
do with finance. 
C. Further development of Co~~nity financing with a view to 
integ-ration 
I. Fina~cin~ nro~osals in the context of fiscal adjust~ent 
1. Financial needs and fin~cin~ nronosals 
In all probability the Co~T.Unity will require new sources of revenue in 
1981/82; by that time revenue from the value-added tax part will be fully 
uti:ized1 ). Discussions on financing will become still ~ore i~portant if 
~he addition&l financial needs when the Co~nity is enlarged are considered 
~d lcng-ter~ developnents are taken into account2). If the integratio~ 
1) See 11.:=::-·.>ei-::er..:.ng der Ge:::einschaft, Beilagen zun Bul::.etin c!er EG11 
(:::::_J..cu-~er:er:t of the Cc::::-:uni -.::;-, Sllpplec:ents to the Ccr.~-::uni ty Bulletin), 
:·::s 1-;, 197:.:·. T..'!e calcula~icns :;:>resented there ir.dicate a fina~cing 
re-::·Jirs::ent of a thousand ~illio:;. ur.its o: account, whic!: would ::e 
p~::at:..~ as :.:-.e price fer t:h.e Cor.:..":':~:i. ty o: N:.ne if applicant countries 
' . .,·~re f""c;.~::· ir.te;rated. 
2) '7:.c, ;.:ac::::ct4~_-all Group sees the relatior.ship betwee:1 the state of 
i:-. :,- .. r.-. t:'.c:1 .s..::c t!:e sl1ar~ of the Cor.:::uni ty G:·J' as it appears in t!:e 
fQ::..:c·,lir.:"" t.::.ble. 
':':.··-.:.2: ~:~~-'--= of inter.ration and Co::-.~:1itv gover~::e:1t s::?..!"e 
~rese~t ~csition (1977) 
~re-:eaeralistic integration 
!edera~:.c:1 ·...-:. t:-. small 
public sector 
federation with large 
public sector 
Share of ·3~2 ~ 
o.~.; 
2.0-2.:;;., 
5.0-7 .C';~ 
7 .5-'10.0;.-
(i~cluciing defence) 
20.0-25.CC,..7 
Co~piled according to ~acDougall Group, Vol I, p 14; see also Notice of 
the Co=oission to the Corrmon Council of Foreign and Finance Ministers and 
+~ +~~ ~.~~~~~" ~D~1;D-~"+ (1Q~ ~ ~-
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process is not to be endangered fro~ the revenue angle, the basic 
fi~ancing possibilities and concrete revenue alternatives ~st be 
analysed in good time. So far this ex~~ination has been sporadic ~d 
1) it was first undertaken systematically by the MacDougall Group and 
particularly by the European Co~~ission2 ). 
Survey 1 is intended to show what criteria and financing proposals have 
been considered in the past. The concrete financing proposals include 
not only an expansion of Co~xrunity borrowing but ~ore especially an 
increase in the share of value-added tax to 1.5;~ or 2% of the co~r.on 
assess~ent basis. Proposals have also been put forward for fir.~cing 
on the basis of assessments other than value added. Excise duties (on 
mineral oil, tobacco, alcohol, motor vehicles and luxuries), inco~e and 
corporation tax and a number of other levies (levies on energy in the 
form of an i~port duty on OPEC oil, on Community farm produce, co~~ested 
areas, etc) are also anong the financing proposals. In line with the 
lir.:i ts ir.:posed at the beginning of this paper, "''e shall not go into the 
obvious suggestion that economies should be effected in expenditure or 
that expenditure should be switched in favour of other tasks3). 
2. T".!:e relaticnshin to fiscal ad,justnent 
It would be impossible to discuss the concrete proposals for financing 
without reference to fiscal adjustment and its systems. 
revenue can be distributed vertically and horizontally. 
1) See EacDo-:1~all Group, Vol II, Chapter 16. 
In principle 
2) Fi::-.a..--:.cin£: t:!:e Co::1.":'l1lni ty Bud,;ct - Future Nethods, Co::~"':":'.U1i ty Bulletin, 
Su:::ple~::ent. E/78; this publication invites the European Parlia:.:e::1t, 
t:-.e Cot: .. --:.c:..l of !·~ir.isters and the Henber countries to co:r.e to ter=s 
v:i th t:-.e ~robler:J of financir..~. 
3) ~ furt:!:cr ~~alysis of Co~r.unity borrowing is also o~itted because 
it wc:.:.:::l te i:::po.ssible ~;:i thout a detailed su.rvey of current 
borrc\:ing:.s and would also have to be considered in conjunction 
wi:~ t~e :uropean currency system. 
..::riteria 
?roposals 
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Survey 1: Assessment criteria and proposals for financing the 
Co;.::-r . .mi tv tud.;!et 
Europea.'l 
Farlia::ent 
- c~ v:...T 
- Epecial levies 
- Percentage of 
other existing 
taxes 
- Specific r.ew 
Co::r::uni ty tax 
MacDougall Group 
- Yield 
- Distributive effect 
- Problems of 
acbiinistration 
-Political 
considerations 
- Econor.;ic 
considerations 
- VAT above 15~ 
- Contribution key 
based on financial 
capacity or overall 
national values 
- Corporation tax 
- Tax-expenditure 
prograr.::::es 
- Levies fror.; ~i~ir.;um 
oil price syste~ 
- Levies for an 
une::p~oy~ent fund 
- Borrowing 
E.Er. Co::::::ission c::r.ers 
1. Tec:!:nical considerations 
- uniform basis of 
assessr.-.ent 
- bread application 
- abundant a."ld 
inexhaustible sources 
of revenue 
- little opportunity 
for tax fraud 
- simple a~~inistration 
2. Institutional/legal 
considerations 
- Funds r.n1st not be 
sutject to decisions 
by Xe::1ber States 
(genuine own resources) 
3. Economic consideratic~s 
- Yiel~capacity to pay 
- Redistribution 
- VAT 
- Cir:nrette tax 
- Alcohol tax 
- Corpo~ation tax 
- I~co:;.e tax 
- Energy tax 
- Petrol tax 
- Levy on 
settle:::ents 
in congested 
cu-e as 
- l.c:..nd value 
growth tax 
- ?reduction 
levies on 
far::: 
produce 
Sources: - F.e;c~t on te:!:alf of the Eudcet Committee on the ~idelines of the 
Eurc;ea.~ ~arliament on Co~~unity Budgetary ~~d Fin~'lcial Policy fo~ 
1~79, Conference Docu::lents 1976-79, 3-78, p 22. 
- l~ac.Jc<.:c=:.ll Group, Vol II, CJ::apter 16. 
- Fir.a~cin~ the Co:::r.:unity Bud~et -Future ~et:!:od, EEC Bulleti~, 
Sup:;:·le:::ent 3/73, p 17 et seqq. 
- H. Giersch: 11PEl.dover fUr eine euro:>lliscl-:e Re;;:-io:;al:>olitik" (Plea 
fer a Eu~opean rc~i~nal c.olicy), Eur~:;:ean Co:::::iissio~~ G~o<.:p of 
Experts on "Econc:::ic and ~onetary Union••, lee cit, D-I, p t.6 et seqq. 
- D. Eiehl: 11Zur Rolle der !:Sffentlic:!':er. }'ins..~zer. in der Eu~cptiisc:!:en 
Inte~ration" {The role of public fir.ance in European integration). 
Integration, ~o 2, 1978, p 35 et se~q. 
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A horizontal fiscal adjust~ent between individual Y.e~ter States te~ds 
to be a marginal note to the co~ments, as the main co~cern is to f:r.ar.ce 
the Cc~~nity budget and in the event of a horizontal distritut:on of 
revenue there would be direct equalization between financially strong 
ar.d financially weak me~ber countries. To this extent horizontal 
fiscal adjust~ent is a method of financing which may be chosen instead 
of or in addition to financing via the Co~~nity budget1 >. Financing 
via horizontal fiscal adjustment in tee wider sense can also cover 
proposals to co:r"'tunalize parts of the social insurance systet:: and the 
taxation of congested areas. A European une~ployment insurance schet::e 
could lead to redistribution effects between countries with a high and 
low rate of employment and even - depending on its form - between higr~y 
paid and low-paid empl~yees2 ). Earmarked financing is also involved in 
the case of a tax on urban concentration, which might be levied in t~e 
form of, say, a land-value tax, a settlement (ie location) tax or a payroll 
tax graduated according to the density of population, the proceeds from 
which could if necessary be used for a policy of decentralization3). 
Within a system of vertical distribution of revenue the distribution of 
fiscal jurisdiction is associated with the determination of vertical 
adjustment of revenue and the degree of Co~nity autonomy in relation 
to revenue-raising jurisdiction and revenue-planning jurisdiction. The 
lowest degree of Community revenue autonomy is associated with allocations 
(financial contributions) from the bottom to the top. The highest degree 
1) For the basic methods of international horizontal fiscal ad2ustrnent 
see G. Eilter, "Horizontale Fir.anzausgleichsbeziehun~en zwisc:-.en 
Nationalstaaten" (RelationshiPs between naticr.s in torizo~tal !isc.:L. 
adjust!':'.ent), Frankfurt 1974, p 26 et seqq a."1d particularly R. Eat!-.e••s, 
"?i:1.a..'1za'.l sgl e ichsr::.echa:1i snen in e in er zu sc.r.:r.Jenwac hsender. .E.uro:; t!:. .se !:en 
Ge::ei.nschaft" O·:echanis::~s of fiscal adjustr:-.ent in a converging Eurcpea=. 
Co::~n~ty), Y.acDougall Group, Vol II, p 423 et seqq. 
2) See Marjolin Report, Annex, p 1 et seqq and r-:acDougall Group, Vol II, 
p 410 et seq. 4 
3) See D. Biehl, U.-A. l:Unzer, ".:.c:glor..erationsoptima und Agglo::erations-
testeueru~c - Fi~~"1zpolitische Konsequen~en aus der Existe~z von 
Bal:.unrs::~bieten" (Concentration optina and ta.xes on conce:r..traticn -
the e!fects on financial policy of the existence of conbested areas), 
appe~~r.; in Forschunes- ur.d Sitzungsberichte cier Akade~ie f~r 
2~u=.fcrschung und Lanciesplanung (Research and Conference Reports of 
tr.e hcade=.y fer regional research and land planning). 
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of revenue autonomy for the Community would be in a divided syste~, in 
~.-hich the type of tax, the basis of assessment and t!:e rates could be 
deternined by the Community. European taxes levied direct by the 
Co~~nity would be characterized by the fact that, ar.ong other th~~gs, 
the taxpayers would be natural persons and legal entities ~~d net co~~tries. 
Autono~ous taxation of this kind by the Coornunity presupposes g~eater 
involve~e~t in the national tax administration because in that case the 
Co~~~ity could no longer approach the member countries for paycent of 
the taxes with legally binding effect. 
Between these two extremes lie the basic possibilities of the vertical 
distribution of revenue. As there has so far been no type of reve~ue, 
with the exception of customs duties, price-adjustment levies and subar 
cuty, for which legislative jurisdiction and revenue-raising jurisdiction 
rested with the top level and the initiation of a more central revenue 
auto~o~y for the Co~~~nity is, as has been shown, very difficult and 
often on~y theoretically possible, Community expenditure will probably 
be finar.ced by means of a tax-sharing system (quota or pooling system) 
or by a o~rcharge system (tax-overlapping) (see Diagram 1) 1). 
Tax-staring is technically possible if all the Member States use the 
s~~e basis for assessment to tax. If the rates of tax were also 
har~onized a for~la could be used to share the total tax yield between 
t!:e "Fourt:r. Level" and the member countries. 
FiLan:i~g by me~~s of a surch~ge syste~, involving co~petition fo~ the 
s~e source cf t~, wculd be characterized by greater autonomy for the 
Ccr.-_T.'..mi t:1 ., ... ~i:h could be put into effect by oaking the :Eurcpea.~ Farlia::ent 
t!:e le6isl~~ive authority. Certainly, a "Europe surc!:arge 11 presup:;:oses a 
1) '7::e ::z.cJour,o.1.1 Group (Vol I, p 507 et seq), r.-.a.l<es a distincticn 
C2L>::e:.!'l :a.x-s!"larin;-, ie distributi~G to.x yield over di:fere:-.t ::.evels, 
c..~d ~s..;(-cverlc.ppi:-.g; for t~E: estaclish.:-::e~t o: a taA-.s!:.::.rir:.; .syste:: 
see also H. Zir:-.::Jerr.".ann, "Fiscal Federalis::1 in t:r.e Federal. ;te-:ut~ic 
o: :3c~::-.::..::.:,·, Paper delivered to tl:e .t.dvisor~· Co~Jr.ission on I~ ter-
t;overn::-:ental Rclations11 , Washington DC, February 1978, pp 14 et seqq 
a:..:: 44 et seqq. 
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har~onized basis of assess~ent. In this case the "Four't!':. Leve::.." 
would apply its own rate of tax to the assess~ent; the rate of t~ 
co~ld be at the s~e or different levels for the various ~e~ter States, 
say according to their ability to pay. 
~~at we have said makes it clear that whether tax-sharing or the 
surcharge system is applied in the Corr~unity, it is not a matter of 
individual taxes but of different opportunities to appropriate yield 
from certain taxes or of transfers of part of the tax yield of the 
member countries. 
In this connection if the economic, technical, legal and integrational 
criteria are examined on the basis of the financing proposals, it is 
clear that their importance depends on the form of fiscal adjust~ent 
selected. The criteria of perceptibility and the lack of effect en 
competition gain importance if a surcharge system or a special European 
tax is substituted for tax-sharing. The use of a given item of revenue 
as an instr~nent of cyclical policy depends partly on the stage of 
economic and political integration reached. Thus the assessment 
criteria are given an importance which is affected by the desired for= 
of fiscal adjustment and it becomes clear that financing proposals and 
criteria cannot be compared without interposing fiscal adjustment. 
This relationship is implicit in the denand for own resources (Article 
201, Treaty of Rone), although the "ovm resources syste:r.11 is not laid 
down in law. According to the Commission's "ideas on institutions11 , 
the feature of own resources is that they "are of a fiscal nature to 
be raised direct fron individuals or businesses in the Co~~unity and 
are not subject to the decisions of the ~:ember States.... The 
resources are not part of the revenue of the ~~eober States a."ld need not 
be shown in the budgets of the Member States or approved by their 
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. 1) 2) parlJ.aments" • 
Althoub~ the o~n resources syste~ has been give~ definite fer~ by the 
Co:':ir::ission, the fact that fiscal adjust::-:ent syste::;s a::d fi:::a."lci:::g 
proposals are being discussed at the sa:-::e tir.e is likely to pr:;,c·..:::e 
contradictions. Thus ....-hile the Cor:::::ission der.:ands Cor.M-::u:::i ty taxes, 
it specifies them in the form of a larger share of t~e value-added 
tax, to which the characteristics of "o"'n resources" as de!i:::ed ty 
the Cor.:~ission itself do not fully apply. It would be necessary to 
rer.:ove the renaining exceptions to the harmonized basis o: assessr.:ent; 
further~ore the calculation procedure accordi~g to ~ethod A, ~hich 
allows a method of levying indepe."ldent of estinates of the assess=ent 
basis, would have to be generally applied3). Finally, i::: its 
Y.er.:orandun the Cor.~ission der::~~ds Cor::~nity taxes but at the sa=e 
tine nakes concrete proposals for three foros of tax-sharing (an 
increase in the rate of VAT and ~)ansfer to the Community of part of 
the cigarette and petrol duties) • 
II. Assessr.:ent of certain financing nronosals 
As a discussion of all proposals on the basis of all the criteria would 
be too lengthy and conplicated, weighting will be applied. The proposals 
which have a lower priority against the background of the criteria 
developed will be dealt with rather briefly so that the alternative 
shown oay be given greater emphasis. 
1. Pro-cosals tending to have a lov:er nriori ty 
The problen with the individual excise duties is that on their o"'n 
they would not be sufficient to cover financial needs. Their pri!:ary 
1) Financing the Corr.rr.unity Budget - Future method, EEC Bulletin, 
Suppler.:e."lt 8/78, p 17. 
2) In the view of the Co~mission theGe requirer.:ents are only fu~fil:ed 
in the case of custons duties and price-adjust~e~t levies. 
3) See G. SpaneJ.:~:is, "1-:er.rwertsteuer-~igen.-::i ttel ft!r die E:-3" (':al'..le-added 
t?.x, ov::: re.scurces for the Ccr.:.uni ty), IFO :Sx:;ress .Ser-:ice, '.'a: 32, 
17 .r:.~ril 1S•7), p 9 et seqc_; this ;.:.;::er sl".c\,·s, a.":lO!:?: ct!-.er t:::.::;s, 
::cv: di::ere:-;ces in tax "r.:orals11 w:d the ef!'iciency of t~e ta.x 
c.c-:-.inis~ratic~ r.:ay c.ffect t!:e di.stri'cutio:r. of burce::s. 
4) .Sc:::e other ter:1 S'..lch as ~ tc.x or Europe .:m tax ( Co::-.:::u..~::. ty T3.X) >.:ould 
ce clearer than "Ger.:ein[;c::-.aftssteuer'' cec:mse in Ger;::a.~ uso.:-e the 
ter::: 11Gcneinschaftssteuer11 is used if the tax yield in a tux-s::ari:::s 
syste::: is avail~ble to .several territorial autr.orities. This c.eani:::s 
of the ter~ is not, however, intended in the passase quoted. 
-56- CT XlX/2.79/79-E 
potential use is for certain non-fiscal purposes, but even tte~ they 
do not fulfil the requirements mentioned. The use of excise cuties is 
on the one hand made difficult because there is not always a har~c~iz~d 
basis of assessment, which is a technical prerequisite, ~d on the other 
t~j ttey raise the problem of different national consu~er habits ~d 
thus the difficulty of achieving the aim of regional redistributio~. 
If the consumption of certain goods, say coffee, wine or beer, is 
particularly high in countries with a low GNP, there will be proble::s of 
distribution which are likely to make political unio~ more difficult fro= 
the outset. A tax on tobacco, especially on cigare~tes, can be justified 
for health reasons but would lack credibility - as it does now in the 
Member States - if the tax were levied in the hope of fiscal gain. 
If it is true that there is a ~ong-ter~ correlation between natio~al 
consumption of energy and national capacity in the ~:ember States, there 
would be an opening for a European tax on energy. Natio~al energy 
cons~::ption (eg of light and heavy oils or electricity) could be used as 
a basis for assessment. Ideas could be defined more closely for the 
case of a tax on petrol or oil, part of the proceeds from which - if no 
surcharge right is granted - could be made available to the Coe-~~ity. 
Depending on the extent to which the different excise duties were 
appropriated nationally to fiscal purposes, eg were earmarked for some 
specific purpose, there would be problems of adjustment if tax-sharing 
were adopted. 
Financing by means of tax deducted from wages or income tax has not so 
far been discussed either on the basis of national ir.corne tax er as a 
su~~~e~entary Cor.~nity income tax with a sep~ate basis for assess~ent. 
In t~e for~er case there are insuperable proble~s of h~~onizatio~, 
w~ereas ir. the latter case, apart from defininb the basis of assess~ent, 
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the relationship between the two taxes would have to be clarified. 
There is also the question of whether the European tax can be co~"lted 
towards the national income tax. 
A European tax on corporations is a source of finance which has 
fre~uently been mentioned but seldom examined in detail1). Here 
again, in spite of existing groundwork for European coopany law, 
t~e need fer har~onization is relatively great, so that for the 
present it must be eliminated as a means of financing for reasons of 
.... '"'~r::e. In the long term there are a multitude of questions, s~ch as 
whether national corporation taxes and a European corporation tax 
should be complem~"ltary or substituted one for the other and the 
associated proble.~ ·;; of coordinating tax rates, tax deductibili ty, 
etc. From the f:..;cal angle it would be necessary to exar.;ine whether 
a yield correspo~ding roughly to the 1% rule in the case of VAT could 
in fact be raised by all the member countries under existing tax law 
and whether in some countries there would be a risk of eroding the 
basis of assessment. The time required for harmonization cannot be 
overestimated because balance sheet disclosure, valuation and 
depreciation, for example, are handled in different ways in different 
countries. A surcharge on existing rates would have to be very high 
to produce a good yield. 
A more realistic proposal, therefore, is that of a supplementary 
E-:1ropear. corporation tax \¥hich could be counted towards the national 
corporation tax. To avoid the problem of different legal forms, so~e 
kinC. c: cc:.:pc:;...-;.y or busi:r.ess tax would be needed, which would then count 
to-v;ardr:; cor":)oraticn or income tax. But even in this case there would 
te :u.rti-.er questions about t!:e nu~ber of taxpayers, the fiscal yield and 
1) Frc:.: t~-.e t=~i~t c:f ~:ie\·i of tax !1ar:t:or:izatio:1, ho~ever, see E. Sc~endstock, 
":-:c::..r::.o:-.::.s:.erunc der :Cesteuennt; von Kapi t::.lsesellschai"ter. 14:-.C. Yon 
.0::. •·icen-.:cr.'· (::-:c.rr::on:.zaticn of the taxation of joint steel<:. cc:-.:;:,a.'1ies 
a: . ..:. ::::. ·::.::.e::.::.s), A!"--:c): ? , Stec:.<"r!w.rr.:or.isier-...r.::;soeric::t des 5-::euer- u::.d 
.F:.::..:...:.:::..t;..::;.:::c=:u.s.:;cs der :;,:3 ( R~::port of the E.::.c Tax and Fi:1ar.ce Co::1r::i t tee 
on tax har~c::.iz~tion), (~eumarx Co~~ittee), loc cit, p 1~1 et seqq, 
a.-;.c ~;.ere ::-ecen-:ly 11!-brr::onisierune; der K!jrperschaftsteuer" (Ear::-.oni::.ation 
of cor~Jr~tion tax), Community Bulletin, Supplement 10/75. 
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the ~ount of a~~inistrative work involved if cornp~ies had to ccr.:ply 
with both European and national corporation tax law. In the case of 
direct taxes, which would fulfil many of the conditions of a Europe~ 
revenue system, ~~swers can only be expected in the long term because 
har=onization is particularly time-consuming owing to greatly 
differing national tax policies in this field. 
2. Increasing the proportion of value-added tax versus introducing 
a "national 'Droduct tax" 
Increasing the rate of value-added tax seerns particularly obvious, as 
the requirements of harmonization will be completed in the next few 
years after years of conversion work relating to the basis of 
assess~ent, and there is a time limit to the remaining anomalies. 
Early agreement to the 2% solution may, however, come up against the 
wish of ~ember countries first to gain experience of the new for= of 
financing and the method of calculation. Moreover, for some countries 
(eg the United Kingdom) raising the rate rneans a substantial loss of 
national yield from value-added tax and therefore a special limitation 
1) 
of national tax autonomy • In the short term Con~~ity autono~y will 
be strengthened only in connection with revenue-raising jurisdiction, 
and perceptibility to the taxpayer will be increased by the fina~cing 
procedure only indirectly, particularly if the total national burden 
of taxation rises. The federalistic structure of the Her.:ber States 
will only be affected where - as in the Federal Republic - the national 
yield from value-added tax is divided between territorial authorities. 
The greatest objection to the value-added tax solution, ho·,..ever, is 
that i~ fa~ls to achieve the declared objective of regional 
1) There mig~t well be a case where the national yie~d from a tax is 
i"-~~fficie~t to cover the European s~are. r~is is ur.i~?ortar.t so 
lo~c ~s ~he basis of assess~ent is used to assess fin~~cial 
co::."t.ritutJ..ons (char,:es); if, ho\.Jever, ov.n resources are invo~ved, 
or ~ direct der.:and on the taxpayer, there wi~l be additional 
protle:::s. See also D. Dosser, "A Federal Budget for the 
Co:::r.:~nity", Federal Solutions to European Issues, London 197.S, 
p 103. 
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redistribution. If the regressive effect is to be avoided it is 
necessary either to ensure a balance by means of other t)~es of revenue 
er to give the value-added tax rule a suitable balancing rr.ech~~is~ 
,.·hich will lirr.i t or avoid its regreE.sive effect. Any such atter::;:>t 
\>Culd undoubtedly lead to distribution struggles beb:een t!'le countries, 
which would do anything but encourage integration. Another 
disadv~~tage is the relatively s~all measure of elasticity in t~e 
yield fro~ value-added tax and the high costs of collection1). 
Use of value-added tax as the chief source of finance also interferes 
with later opportunities to use the revenue of the Community budget 
in the interests of stability. This objection gains weig~t if, fro~ 
the point of view of growth or distribution, Co~~ity expenditure is 
classified as "above the trade cycle112 ). In view of the nur.:erous 
disadvantages of the value-added tax arrangement we must finally ask 
how its further develop~ent in the own resources system will affect 
newly joined cou~tries and what the effect will be of differences in 
tax a~~inistration and the tax fraud quota. 
1) In this connection it may be mentioned that the Neu~ark Co~~ittee -
though not in the context of financing the Co~~r.ity budget -
reco~~enced a narrower basis of assess~ent for har~onization, 
"Steuerharr.:onisierungsbericht des Steuer- unci Finanzausschusses 
der Zi·JG" (Report of the EEC Tax ~'1d Finance Cor:-.::;ittee on tax 
har~onization), loc cit, p 42 et seqq, also D. Dosser, "A Federal 
Budget for the Cor.:r:':uni ty", Federal .Solutions to Euro:;:ea.~ iss.Jes, 
loc cit, p 106; Dosser takes the view that narrowing the basis of 
assesc~ent for the new ~e~ber countries would ~ean a consideratle 
si~plificatio~. 
2) In this connectio~ we might also :cnsider Oates' pro:;:>osal to make 
value-added tax an instru~ent of :~ropean cyclical ecor.o~ic policy. 
His r-roposal preou:;:>poses greater taxatio:1 pov:ers, in the se::1se of a 
c::ar.ge in the tax rate for the Co::::::unity, ar..d is t'!:e s..:.bject of :::uch 
discussic:1 as to hm·l it v;ould work - all tec}-...!lical a::C. :e£;.::;.1 
c::J::1::!:tic::s beir.g fulfilled. If Oates' view is not s:::ared ever. i~ 
t~e cess c: different rates for certain classes of ~oocis (fer ex~p:e, 
l~r..lrJ' ;cc~s ~~d tte necessities of life) al: ttat is left is tte 
\'i~:.;:::..:_ e.!fect, or the visibility of such :::e.:;.s'.lres for a cco:::-C.::::ated 
rc..::..c~· of s":.'"lbili~.ottio::-1. See W.E. Oates, "Fi:1ar.z-F~cer2.lis:-us in 
-:-:.~:.:-:. ·. -u:-.:: ~-r2xis: Ler.ren fUr die Europ!Hsche Ge:-::einsC:::::.tfte!'l" 
(.:':!.::.:::~.::.. .?'ecerr.lir~ in Theory and Practice: Lessons for the :Suropea.~ 
Cc~~~n:t1es), MacDoucall Grou:;:>, Vol II, p 3Cv et seq. Eut see 
?.. :::.2.:er, ".:::ie ir.direkten Steuern als Ir.::;t:::-u:::ent der Stabilisie:-.. u::::s-
_;::.c=. ::._ t:.~:, i:::sceccndere einer EOlc}:cn Z'J.r r:c::1~~:-J.:t:J.rc!:J:::pfu:::.:::" ( :!::-.cirec t 
t2-xes .:;.s ;:;...~ i::1stru:::ent of st.J.bilizatic!'l :;:olicy, particularly of a 
:;:~~icy intended to curb excessive eco:1c~ic activity), Sctweizeriscte 
Zeitscriift fUr Volkswirtschaft und Statistik (Swiss Journal of Econo~ics 
and Statistics), No 4, Dece~ber 1978, p 735 et seqq. 
-
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In spite of the fact that a share in value-added tax does r.ct =eet 
all the require~e~ts of Euro~ean revenue, it will probably nevert~eless 
be used as a financing instru~ent, because increasin; it to a hi~~er 
percentage is a~~inistratively easy; after the relev~~t resolutions 
of the Council and the European Parliament all that is required is 
ratification of the increased rate by the Member States and it does not 
change the existing system of vertical adjustment of revenue1). 
As the national product has been recognized as a "fair" indicator of 
the national capacity to pay, at least since the United Kingdo~ 
renegotiated entry to the Community, the move~ent away froo the national 
product as an indicator of capacity to pay and the change to value-added 
tax fi~ancing see~s, with hindsight, to be unfortunate2). It is 
therefore proposed that instead of increasing the share of the basis for 
assess~ent of value-added tax there should be a change in the basis of 
assess~ent in favour of the G!W~. At the same time the Co~~nities 
should be able to fix the share of the new basis of assess~ent freely and 
without an upper limit. Under this proposed revenue system, with auto~o=y 
of rate for the Con~unities, the member countries will still be liable to 
tax. We have at the SaMe time both a type of overall sharing syste~, as 
the funds are derived from the revenue of the me~ber countries, and also, 
because of the power to fix tax rates ("rate jurisdiction"), an earcarked 
divided system. 
Regardless of which national product value is selected, there is no need 
fer tar~onization in the determination of a basis for assess~ent in view 
of the ex~~tence of agreed figures produced by the Statistical Cffice of 
t~e ~rcpear. Co~~nities relating to taxation, valunticn ar.d de:inition. 
T:-.e ":.S-...rostn.tistics" contain a nur:iber of definitions of national pro~·~ct 
(sross do~estic product, gross national product, disposable incc~e, etc) 
ar.d al~ ttat is needed is a decision as to which of these values shall be 
-:z_\ 
used ~s a b~s:s/) 
1) It !-. .::.s teen ca2.culated ttat fro~ the fi[;cal point of viev.r a Z.- arr3..-:=-e:-:e~t 
to t:-.e end of the 1:;:cs \·Jould be sufficient only on the asst:::::;::t:on ttat 
2) 
':i :::'1 s:: :;:::r. t cccnc~ic gr01-:th there \-lould be no addi tion.::.l ex:;: en.ses arisi::::; 
en er.l:.rt;c:::e:n of the Ccr;:-:ur.i ties ar.d that no further f:.sc?-2. ct:icc.-:ic::s 
:-.c:J.:::i ::.:::.':~ :o te ur.dert.::l~en ir. nssociation with a.~ econor:-.ic ar.d ~onetary 
u::-.:c::. "Fir ..:..::cir.c the Cc~~:.1ni ty budget - :Future ~ethcci 11 , Co::-:.".lr.i ty 
zulletin, Supple~ent 6/78, p 19. 
i:::ee also G. Denton, "Reflections on Fiscal Federalis!':l in the 
of Co=~on ~arket Studies, Vol 16, No 4 (1976), p 299. 
":'":¥' 11 
......Jv ' 
Journal 
3) But see Section B IV, 2.2.1.2, also MacDougall Group, Vel II, p 457 et seq 
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If the gross national product at market prices is chosen as t~e basis 
of assessment this proposal would also meet the other tecr~~ical 
criteria. An adequate yield is guaranteed by the elasticity of the 
revenue and the autonomy of the Co~T.Unities regarding rates; 
si~ilarly levying and transfer do not present any proble~s. Tne 
national federalist structure and tax policy are affected relatively 
little because there is no competition for the s~e tax revenue. 
Perceptibility and cheap payment are not yet in the forefront in this 
type of vertical revenue distribution. Recourse to the individual 
taxpayer is not yet envisaged in the context of this proposal. 
The econo~ic criteria can also all be met, This proposal sterns from 
a regard for the national ability to pay; redistribution between 
regions can be achieved by means of an above-average burden on the 
countries with a higher per caput income. Rate autono~y wou~d make 
it possib~e to achieve economic objectives in conjunction with operations 
relating to debts. Moreover, use of the nominal G~W produces effects 
in connection with price rcovernents in the r.:1ember countries, alt!:.ough 
these ~st be considered in conjunction with the time-lag - sometimes 
for tectnical reasons - in the basis of assessment. Arguments relating 
to cc::petition drop into the background in the case of "national product 
tax". 
T~e objections to this simple proposal for financing are concerned on 
the one hand with legal and integrational aspects and on the other with 
doubts as to the tax syster.:1. The crux of the latter is that this 
prcposal takes no account of existing tax structures. Objections on 
the i~te~rat~on side are that there is no individual tax-s~aring, nor 
is a ~1rctar8e system introduced. An argu~ent against the claim that 
t~e ~rc:;:osa:.. fails to meet a criterion of the oy,n resources syster.: 
r.:e~ti:~::d "ty t~e Cor..r.:ission - namely that the "national product tax" 
'"'o:.:::.d not be paid directly by individuals a.''ld businesses - is t~at this 
is net, or is at any r.ate partly not, the case wit~ the value-added tax 
proposal put forward by the Comcission. Moreover, the national prcduct 
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solution does not eliminate the possibility that other types of revenue, 
for example individual tax-sharing in the case of cineral oil t~ could 
be used. In the long term a "revenue syste::1" will e:r.erge, partiC"..llarly 
if the disadvantage of one type of revenue is outweighed or financing 
the Co~~unity at any time solely by excise duties is avoided. The 
consequence of this proposal is greater revenue autonomy for the 
European Parliament, ie the system of vertical distribution of funds 
would move a step forward towards a federal solution. The European 
Parlia~ent would not be so strengthened by developcent of the own 
resources system if the share of value-added tax were increased. 
III. Strengthening budget control as a condition for the future 
growth of revenue 
For a continuing development of the revenue system towards integration 
the mere absence of obstruction to further integration in potential 
additional sources of revenue is not enough. Even if it is borne in 
mind that in the medium term Community revenues can be used to perfor::l 
tasks outside the fiscal sphere as well, the future planning of revenues 
requires further strengthening of the institutions controlling the budget. 
This applies not only to the financing of futur~ tasks, but also to the 
debated budgetarization of the Coal and Steel Community and the European 
Development Fund. Budgetary integration would also bring changes in 
revenue ~~d in the fiscal adjustment system if the production charge of 
the Coal and Steel Community was communalized. In strengthening 
budgetary control we must not think only of the European Audit Office1) 
but more particularly of the authority of the European Parlia~ent, 
particularly as regards the control of expenditure. Even if the 
budgetary rights of the Parliament have in the past been increased 
in respect of the expenditure side, this must not blind us to the fact 
1) See C. -D. Ehlermann, "Der Europliische Rech."lungshof" (The European 
Audit Office), Baden-Baden 1976. 
t .... 
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that increasing powers have been concentrated in the Councils of 
}:inisters and the Council of Europe and that this develop!:1ent has 
also prejudiced the position of the Commission1). The direction 
to be taken by this development2) and whether, in addition to the 
co~trol of expenditure, it will also lead to greater revenue autono~y 
(the right to authorize taxation)3) will ultimately be decided in the 
political argument as to the future part to be played by the organs 
of the Community in the context of the federal and confederal 
financial constitution described in detail at the beginning of this 
4) paper • 
1) Cn this political appraisal see E. Klepsch, E. Reister, "Der 
e'.lro:ptiisc1".e Atceordnete" (The V.e:r1ter of the European Parlia:::ent), 
Eade~-Eaden 1978, p 19, and from t~e point of view of political 
scie:-.ce, V. Herr.:ar.., J. Lodge, "The European Parliament and the 
European Cc:-~7-uni ty", New York 1978. 
2) See also E. Grabitz, "Das Europ~ische Farlament vor der Direktwahl" 
(Tte ~ropean Parliarr.ent before the direct elections), Integration, 
tlo 2/79, p 47 et seqq. 
3) In ttis co~~ection see the discussion on a new Article 201 of the 
Treaty of Rome on future funds, 1974/75. 
4) See p 8; 
